Muslim Heretics Conference

The Evolution of Islamic Democracy in the New Iraq

Enrique Portaluppi

January 19, 2009

Part I. Overview of Islam and Democracy
Objective: This essay will attempt to demonstrate that Islam and Democracy can work in juxtaposition and simultaneously within the same system of governance. This essay will use Iraq as the main case study to establish how civil law and Islamic law can work side by side with each other and how this combination of ideology and theology can successfully evolve into a legitimate Islamic Democracy.
Section 1. Introduction to Islamic Democracy
The term Islamic Democracy has been a controversial and systematically debated phrase in this era of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Within the Judeo – Christian West, the concept of separation of church and state has laid the groundwork for the modern democratic principles that makeup the governments of the West. (In this paper, the term “West” stands for the modern democratic societies of Western Europe and the United States) Nevertheless, with the revivalism of Islamic movements throughout the world, the expression din wa dawla, which when translated means, “religion and state” takes on an important relevance when describing modern Islamic governments. 1 Unfortunately, the West´s inability to see democracy and religion working within the same system of governance clouds the correlation between Islam and modern democratic ideals, making it an unidentifiable idiom.
Western style democracy was born from the ashes of the European religious wars, subsequently leading to the Westphalian Peace accords that recognized individual state sovereignty within the European political system. These ideals led to a new system of governance that became the secular governments of the European order that eventually evolved into the modern Western democracies that are seen today as the model for democratic expansionism throughout the globe. 2
The case for an Islamic Democracy has had many critics within the Western community. Can Muslim society imitate the style of democracy that is practiced by the West? In order to put democracy and Islam into proper perspective with each other, the correct question that ought to be asked is; should Muslim society imitate Western style secular democracy at the expense of Islam? Aside from the unique case of Turkey, could a Muslim society accept and function without Islam as being an integral part of their social, economic and political system? This is what makes Turkey unique from the rest of its Muslim brethren. Turkey accepted democracy at the time of great Islamic upheaval as the final great Islamic Dynasty, the Ottomans collapsed under the pressure of Western Imperialism. Rather than being left behind within the hierarchy of the international order, Turkey accepted Westernization as a means of competing with the Western powers. The alternative could have been the indignity of colonization, a fate that occurred too many of the states within the Middle East.
This type of acquiescence could not take place within the Muslim societies of today as a new Islamic revivalism has reintroduced a sense of renewed pride and dignity back into the world of Islam. As a means of reclaiming their former greatness, Islamic societies have been attempting to purge themselves of Western influence. Therefore, in an authentic Islamic society, the separation of religion from that of politics and economics is incomprehensible as all facets of life are to be guided by the Quran, the Hadith (collection of eyewitness accounts, narratives and sayings of the Prophet) and the Sunnah (normative practice or exemplary behavior of the Prophet) in conjunction with Islamic law set forth by the Sharia. 3
Many Muslim religious leaders, the most outspoken being the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, have stated that democracy is an alien concept to Islam and that Islamic governance and political participation is embedded within its own tradition. 4 Moreover, as a general rule, the overwhelming majority of Islamic fundamentalists and traditionalists reject democracy and the attributes that accompany it, such as modernization and Westernization, stating that these properties are unIslamic and have no value in an authentic Islamic society. 5
Section 2. Islamic Governments Throughout History
Throughout the history of Islamic politics, Muslim societies have seen many different types of governance. Early Muslim society witnessed the rise of great Islamic empires such as the Umayyads; the Abbasids; and later the Ottomans. The Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties of early Muslim history were ruled by the Caliphate, in which the Caliph is identified as the “Rightly Guided One” following in the footsteps of the Prophet. 6 The end of the Caliphate era was followed by another great Islamic dynasty, the Ottomans, where rulers named Sultans viewed themselves as the caretakers and defenders of Islam. Regrettably for the Muslims, the defeat of Germany and its allies in WWI marked the end of the great Islamic dynasties as the Ottoman Empire was eventually partitioned and colonized by the victorious Western Powers. Post WWII saw the end of the imperialism era in the Middle East region, but concurrently led to the rise of several new autocratic monarchies such as the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran and the ibn –Saud Monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Both regimes attained power primarily through the support of the West and in particular Washington.
The mid - twentieth century also saw the rise of Islamic military regimes such as General Zia ul – Haq of Pakistan, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya and Gamal Nasser of Egypt. These strongmen overthrew their previous regimes by forcefully wresting control of their governments by invoking the assimilation of a more traditional brand of Islam that gave them the appearance of a legitimate Islamic society. Unfortunately, a return to Islamic ideals was only a temporary measure in order to gain the support of the populace as all three regimes reverted to a more authoritative brand of governance, and in the process silenced all political and religious opposition.
The end of the Cold War and the Soviets humiliating defeat in Afghanistan witnessed the rise of a new brand of extreme fundamentalism akin to that of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia; that being the Taliban of Afghanistan. The Taliban´s strict brand of Islam was viewed by Washington as a threat to national security as the Taliban formed an alliance and harbored the radical Islamic organization, al – Qaeda, which was responsible for numerous attacks against U.S. interests worldwide. All of these systems of Muslim governance have one thing in common in that they are all deficient in emulating any sort of egalitarian system of governance as political power is monopolized by the oligarchy.
Section 3. Definition of Democracy and Legitimate Opposition
In order to properly identify if Islam and democracy can coexist with each other, it is vital to define the term democracy and its characteristics. The definition of a democracy by Western standards used as the model in the global democratization process is stated as a system of governance “by the people in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system.” This system of governance requires the following characteristics; sovereignty of the people; government based upon consent of the governed; majority rule; minority rights; guarantee of basic human rights; free and fair elections; equality before the law; due process of law; and constitutional limits on government, social, economic, and political pluralism. 7 To expand this definition a step further, a democratic republic is all of the aforementioned characteristics of a democracy but also includes a head of state that is usually a president or a prime minister, however not a monarch.
This definition has for all intensive purposes become the basis of the form of democracy that the West is trying to promote throughout this new global environment where economic and security interdependence is the pillar to autonomous sovereignty. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research essay there is one key element that has been inconspicuously left out of the preceding definition and better clarifies the definition of democracy; that being the fundamental characteristic of legitimate political opposition in a society and its necessity in a democratic polity. Without legitimate oppositional organizations, the political structure becomes a uni-partisan construction incapable of making any significant change within the political configuration. A bi-partisan or multi-partisan political structure is required to ensure that the governed society is given the option to make political change if so desired. The key word in the previous statements regarding oppositional organizations is legitimate, since not all organizations are considered legal or politically constructive within the systems they wish to represent. 8
Within many past Muslim governments, oppositional organizations have been branded as revolutionary and thus declared illegal and banned from political participation and assembly. Initially, many of these organizations such as Egypt´s Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat –I-Islam of Pakistan have started as legitimate and legal voices of opposition within their respective systems, but shortly thereafter found themselves declared as radical revolutionaries, subsequently leading to many of their organizers and most outspoken voices to be exiled, imprisoned, or in the worst case scenario executed. 9 This type of counter-reformist behavior has delegitimized any discourse of reform that these states were trying to achieve.
Section 4. Islamic Modernist View of Democracy
Unlike Islamic Fundamentalists and Traditionalist, Modernists have a more progressive attitude towards the West. According to Modernists, the only way to combat the West was not to reject but to embrace the source of their strength; that being science and technology. Many Islamic scholars have attributed Islam´s decline during the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the Fundamentalist and Traditionalist´s strict observance of dogmatic canon that leaves absolutely no room for interpretation (Taqlid). Modernists argue that rigid adherence of Sunni fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) has inhibited independent, creative and critical thought and stunted the development of Islamic progression. In Modernist´s views, this was the major contributing factor in Islam´s loss of power and backwardness as it was unable to fend off European Imperialism. 10
The main proponents of Islamic Modernism were Jamal al – din al – Afghani and his disciples, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Jamal al – Afghani (1838 – 1897), known as the father of Islamic Modernism, pressed for reform through the reinterpretation of Islam (Ijtihad) in order to adapt it to modern situations and problems arising within the Muslim world. Al – Afghani was extremely critical of the ulama (scholars of Islamic theology and jurisprudence) that have allowed Islam to stagnate and to be surpassed by the West. In his view, Islam was a dynamic progressive religion that requires constant reinterpretation in order to accommodate modern concerns. A staunch opponent of secularism, al – Afghani was however an advocate of constitutionalism and parliamentary government in the form of an Islamic Democracy; which he states can only be attained through the practice of ijtihad. 11
Muhammad Abduh (1849 – 1905) was al – Afghani´s prize pupil. He became one of Egypt´s leading ulama and mufti (Chief Judge of the Sharia court) and was also an ardent proponent of ijtihad. He blamed Islam´s subservience to the West on the ulama´s teachings of taqlid. He believed that Muslims could successfully incorporate many Western ideals as long as they were not contrary to the laws of Islam. 12
Rashid Rida (1865 – 1935) was the protégé of Abduh and traveled extensively with him spreading the ideals of Islamic reform. Rida´s contribution to Modernism came in the form of redefining the implementation of Islamic law. Rida stated that Islamic law required an Islamic government and that the interpretation of the law was to go through a process of consultation (Shura). He also advocated the return of the Caliphate in order to unite the Ummah (Muslim community). Similar to his previous mentors, Rida believed that the greatest threat to Islam was Western Imperialism. Nevertheless, he insisted that Islam could learn from the West by incorporating many of their strengths and adapting them to fit into Muslim culture. 13
Muhammad Iqbal (1875 – 1938) represented the next generation of Islamic Modernists. Educated in the West and also in Islamic learning, his ideals of modern realities was not in line with that of the ulama of India. Iqbal urged that the right of ijtihad and ijma (authoritative consensus) should be transferred from the ulama to a national assembly or the legislature of that society. 14
There have been many ensuing Islamic Modernists that agree that Islamic reform cannot be attained without the components of ijtihad (reinterpretation), shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus). Neo - Modernists also agree that these three components are the main ingredients in formulating an Islamic Democracy. In fact, these three words demonstrate very similar tendencies to the type of discourse represented in the style of language expressed in a democracy. They (Modernists) may not all agree on the form or characteristics required in an Islamic Democracy, however they are all in agreement that these are the three main components that are necessary to validate and legitimize such a system. Without these components, any other form of Islamic government would be an archaic and outdated system that would be doomed to eventual failure within this era of Islamic revivalism.
Therefore, in light of the preceding definitions of democracy in conjunction with Islamic Modernists theories of the reinterpretation, consultation and consensus of Islamic jurisprudence, it can be reasonably deduced that an Islamic Democracy is a very viable and achievable alternative to the past and current systems of Muslim governance. By manipulating the ideologies of Western Democracy and incorporating it into the theological foundations of Islam, the resulting system would yield a government that respects the rights of Muslims on both the civil and religious level while also allowing for political participation.
Section 5. Brief Examination of Alternative Modern Forms of Islamic Government
Currently, there are several Islamic governments that possess the title of Islamic Republic, that being the Islamic Republics of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. All of these governments proclaim to be republics by the strict definition of the term where Islam and Sharia law have been incorporated within their governing systems as a means of gaining legitimacy throughout their respective societies and in the Muslim world.
Pakistan and Afghanistan´s systems have achieved a significant amount of popular participation and representation in government affairs and in the decision - making process as both states have recently held elections with great success. Additionally, both governments have provisions within their constitutions that uphold the ideals of Islamic jurisprudence as well as maintaining a functioning executive, legislative and judicial branch of government. According to the characterizations specified in the previous two sections, Pakistan and Afghanistan´s systems fit nicely within the description of Islamic Democracy. The verification of Pakistan and Afghanistan´s system as an Islamic Democracy however, is not under investigation within the scope of this essay. Instead, Part II of this essay will demonstrate through a closer examination of Iraq´s more recently established system (similar to that of Afghanistan and Pakistan), that Islamic Democracy is in fact becoming a viable preference for Muslim society.
Iran´s Republic also benefits from a limited amount of participation as its government contains an executive, legislative and judicial branch of government, but inevitably yields ultimate political power to the theocratic Fiqih (supreme legal expert and religious authority). Iran´s system of governance permits a lesser amount of pluralism than do the previous cases in which application of a stricter version of Islamic jurisprudence has curtailed freedom of expression as individuals, private organizations and political parties must operate within the strict structure of Iran´s revolutionary Islamic identity. 15 Even though Iran has enjoyed a greater degree of democratization than it has ever experienced, and has been seen as the model for revolutionary Islamic governance that stands against Western ideals; Iran´s brand of Islamic politics has not been able to spread throughout other Muslim states. It is apparent that the global desire to achieve a greater measure of political participation is becoming highly desirable as the people of varying societies seek greater empowerment in the affairs of their respective governments, which has curtailed further expansion of Iran´s theological system.
As the idea of greater political participation along with the renewed sense of religious ideals begins to spread globally, the concept of an Islamic Democracy might not be as farfetched as many Westerners believe it to be. Many Western scholars or political analyst might make the case that the Republic of Turkey is the contemporary model of Islamic Democracy. With its successful parliamentary polity that has lasted for over seventy five years, there is no doubt that Turkey has become one of the most successful and internationally recognized Muslim governments of the modern era. 16 Albeit all of its successes, the modern Turkish system of governance is a secular democratic system that does not take into account religious jurisprudence and therefore cannot be identified as an Islamic Democracy.
Other Muslim states that demonstrate modern Islamic democratic traits are the governments of Jordan and Lebanon. Jordan has been identified as a constitutional monarchy that holds popular representative elections and contains numerous political parties that impact the political process to varying degrees. 17 Nevertheless, Jordan´s monarchy holds the preponderant executive power in the government, which has been used on a number of occasions by the late King Hussein and his heir King Abdullah II for the purpose of consolidating their power. 18 Moreover, the succession of executive power is not determined by the electoral process but by the heir apparent who holds the office for life; thus eliminating Jordan as a legitimate democracy.
Lebanon is an interesting case study for the success of democratic ideals. It is a state that has a wide ethnic population of Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and a host of other religious ethnicities and cultures. Lebanon has been categorized as a republic with an executive, legislative and judicial branch of government that holds regular popular elections. The system of governance named Confessionalism, developed in 1943 by the ruling French constituency, ensured that sectarian conflict and rivalry would be kept to a minimum and that the many religious groups within the polity were represented. This meant that a sectarian government was to be identified in accordance with the major religious communities; thus the President was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Chamber was to be a Shiite Muslim. The other religious communities were to be represented by and to hold a number of other key positions within the polity. Even though Lebanon is a model of legal and fair oppositional representation within the political system; the fact that Christians and Muslims hold key offices within the system and that Islamic law is not adhered to disqualifies Lebanon as a legitimate Islamic democracy. 19
The basis of democratic ideals lie within the Quran itself as democratic principles have been imbedded within its very verses, meanwhile professing the concepts of social justice throughout it´s very the text. The Quran is much more than just a collection of religious writings and revelations handed down by the Prophet; but a blueprint for Muslims on how to best conduct themselves in an exemplary manner within the communal social order in which they live in. Moreover, the Quran teaches the ultimate unity and equality of all believers and visualizes a society based on this unity and equality. 20 By adhering to the theological examples within the Quran, Muslim governance can achieve a profusion of individual and social justice that in many ways emulate Western democratic ideals while still falling within the boundaries of Islamic governance. 21
Section 6. Globalization and 9/11
Globalization has caused an increase of interdependence within the global international system as states now rely on each other for reciprocal cooperation to attain a greater degree of economic and sovereign security. During the decade of the 1990´s, Washington attempted to propagate the spread of democracy in order to attain a greater degree of mutual cooperation as globalization rapidly expanded. This strategy of democraticizing the globe falls in line with the Democratic Peace Theory, which asserts that democracies generally do not go to war with one another. In order for a state to succeed within this international system they are required to fall in line and play by the rules of the global world order, with the United States at the top of the hierarchy. 22
However, the brand of democracy that the United States and the remaining Western powers are attempting to impose does not fall in line with the type of principles that are found within Islamic politics. This brings about a conflict between ideology and theology as the Western ideal of democracy differs greatly from the brand that Muslim states are seeking to implement, causing Washington to employ a strategy of cautious hesitation in offering aid and support. 23 Democraticizing and globalization notwithstanding, Islamic traditionalists and fundamentalists closely scrutinize the fine line between the qualities of democratic principles and that of the traits of modernization and secularization; both seen as characteristics of modern Western society and found to be incompatible with Islamic society.
The tragedy of 9/11 has bought about a radical swing in how Washington currently disseminates democracy; no longer exercising patience in waiting for a slow democratic transformation to occur throughout the Middle East region. Washington has instead resorted to the use of its military as a means of extending its foreign policy aims and by expediting the spread of democracy to better meet its international objectives. As a result of this new shift in policy, the Middle East region has endured a forced amalgamation of ideological and theological fault lines as the notion of Islamic Democracy is beginning to assert itself within Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, the force feeding of democracy to societies that have never experienced it before has initially created many problems on the social and political level as many of these societies were not prepared for the sudden ideological shift. The resulting byproducts of Washington´s impatience that has been heaped upon these societies have been societal unrest, sectarian violence, separatist movements, occupation by foreign powers, and worst of all a new call to Jihad as foreign fighters poured into these regions.
From these multitudes of problems can a legitimate Islamic Democracy evolve into the type of governance that can be accepted by not only the ruling polity, but also very importantly to include the religious ulama? Without a theological foundation, the ideological foundation will never take root. The remainder of this essay will focus on how Iraq is attempting to resolve these issues.
Part II. Examination of Iraq as an Islamic Democracy
Section 1. Brief History of Iraq Prior to U.S. Invasion
Iraq is an interesting case study of how a multitude of ethnic cultures and religious sects have simultaneously developed over the last fourteen centuries of Islamic influence. A detailed history of Iraq is undoubtedly outside the scope of this essay, however a brief history of Shiite – Sunni rivalry is important to understand the current political environment of the new Iraq. These ethnic and sectarian differences have become an integral part of Iraq´s identity.
The sectarian differences that are witnessed in Iraq today stem from centuries of Shiite oppression at the hands of the Sunnis. Shiites identify themselves through the persecution of their Imams (Divine and righteous leader of the Shiites), beginning with the rejection of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (Ali – first Shiite Imam, cousin and son and law of the Prophet) as the first Caliph of the Muslim community following the death of the Prophet. The followers of Ali (Alids), who later became Shiites, felt that only the decedents of the Prophet were qualified to lead the Ummah due to their divine lineage. Ali eventually became the fourth Caliph of the Sunni sect and the first Imam of the Shiite sect; however this did not alleviate the feeling of injustice instilled upon the Alids for the shunning of Ali. The defining moment in Shiite history however, came in the year 680, when the Alids convinced Hussein Ibn Ali (Son of Ali, grandson of the Prophet and third Shiite Imam) into gathering a rebellion against the oppressive Umayyad Caliphate. The treachery committed by the Umayyads led to the slaughter of Hussein and his followers at Karbala, which led to his eventual aura of martyrdom. It is these original injustices and the suffering of the Imams and its subsequent related events that have become the paradigm of oppression for the Shii community at the hands of the Sunnis. 24
The Iraqi Muslim society flourished during the commencement of the Abbasid Caliphate in the year 750, as Islam began to spread throughout the Middle East. The Abbasids, who were heavily influenced by Persian culture, moved the Caliphate capital from Damascus to Baghdad in order to more closely emulate the Persian model of governance. This period marked one of the greatest cultural and literary advances in Islamic history, but concurrently brought about the beginning of the Sunni´s dominance over their numerically superior Shiite population within Iraq. Not to be overshadowed, this period also began the rivalry between the Arab and Persian cultures, as both cultures vied for dominance within the region. 25 In 1035 the Turkic Seljuqs conquered Baghdad and reinstated the Abbasid Caliphate after a brief absence without it. Staunch followers of the Caliphate and of Sunni Islam, the Seljuqs began a period of Shiite suppression as local Shii leaders were subdued and silenced. 26 The Mongol conquest of 1258 saw a brief period of relaxation of Shiite oppression as the Mongols embraced the Twelver – Shiite form of Islam. This period of repressive relaxation lasted only until 1453, when the Ottomans gained full strength and reconquered the region under the new title of the Sultanate. From that point until the beginning of the twentieth century, the Iraqi Shiites fell under the harsh rule of the Sunni Ottoman Turks who held them in low regard and treated them as second-class citizens. 27

A small measure of hope was restored to the Iraqi Shiites during WWI, when the British expelled the Ottomans; however that soon disappeared after the liberators became the colonizers of Iraq for the purposes of exploiting their resources. The development of Iraqi independence movements in the 1930´s and 1940´s brought about a greater strengthening of Sunni social dominance and a further decline in social status for the Shiites.
In 1963, the Baath party assumed control of Iraq and brought about the lopsided oligarchy regime of the Sunnis. In 1979, Shii fortunes took an even greater turn for the worse as the successful coup of Saddam Hussein began a period of brutal repression of not only the Shiites, but the Kurds as well. Saddam´s crackdown of the Shiites and the Kurds was a result of his failure in the Iran – Iraq war and fear that his majority Shiite population would feel empathy for Iran and join the conflict against the Baathists. Saddam also feared that an exhausted military might not be able to stand up to a Shiite or Kurdish revolt. Therefore he used drastic and extremely brutal measures to put down any sort of rebellion. 28
Section 2. Post U.S. Invasion Iraq
The Republic of Iraq officially began in January 2005 as Iraqis held their first free and popular elections in decades. The official name does not contain the title of Islamic Republic, therefore is it possible to classify Iraq as an authentic Islamic Democracy that abides by both civil and theological law? Further examination of Iraq´s constitution and governing body will verify whether Iraq can be identified as an Islamic Democracy.
The constitution that was ratified in October of 2005 by the 275-seat democratically elected parliament, states that Iraq is a federal democratic representative republic that abides by the laws of Islam as its fundamental source of legislation. Section One, Article two, declares that Islam is the official religion of the State and that no law can be established that contradicts the provisions of Islam along with the principles of democracy. The constitution also guarantees the rights and religious observations of all ethnic and sectarian groups within the state. 29
Iraq´s society breaks down into many parts, ethnically, religiously and sectarianly. Arabs make up the majority of the ethnic population at 75%; Kurds at 15%; Turkomen at 5% and small percentages of Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians make up the balance. Religious percentages are as follows; Muslims at 97%; Christian and other religions at 3%. Of the Muslims; 65% is Shiite while Sunnis comprise 35%. 30
It is evident that there are large differences within the ethnic and sectarian divisions that comprise the varying interest groups all trying to gain dominance within the system. For example, the Kurds make up 15% of the population; however they are mostly comprised of Sunnis. Does this make them loyal to any particular Sunni sect or do they retain tribal and ethnic loyalties that go beyond religious similarities? Another important question must be raised; are all of these diverse ethnic and religious groups represented within the new Iraqi Islamic Democracy?
Section 3. Iraq´s Political System
3A. Legislative
In order to better identify Iraq as an Islamic Democracy, it is important to understand the political structure of Iraq and how it represents the Iraqi society. The Iraqi Council of Representatives (ICR) is the legislative branch of the government. It is comprised of 275 members and represents the many religious and ethnic groups that are part of the Iraqi society. A little known fact about the ICR is that 25% of its members are required to be women, thus demonstrating that women are considered to carry an equal voice within the political system. 31
Like all political systems, there is a majority and a minority party. The 128 seat majority in the ICR is held by a coalition of many different Shii political organizations called the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). This political coalition is made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (fka the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq); the Islamic Virtue party; the Islamic Dawa party and a small contingency of other small Shii parties. All told the UIA holds the majority of seats within the ICR and also holds several high government positions such as that of Nouri – al – Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister and leader of the Islamic Dawa party. The fiery Mullah Muqtada al – Sadr and his Sadrist Movement is also incorporated and represented within this organization and currently holds 30 of the 128 seats. 32
The second largest political party in the ICR holding 53 seats is the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan. They are a coalition of Kurdish political organizations that include the two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); who at one point were engaged in a civil war with each other along with other smaller groups. These former enemies united for the purpose of consolidating their power in order to contest the UIA. There are several officials from this coalition that hold high ranking positions within the government such as Jalal Talabani; the secretary general of the PUK and acting President of Iraq. 33
The next largest contingent holding 44 seats in the ICR is the Iraqi Accord Front (IAF aka the al – Tawafuq Front). The IAF is a coalition of mainly Sunni Islamist Iraqi political parties that are made up mostly of Sunni-Arabs focused on protecting this community’s interests. 34
The remaining seats are spread throughout numerous political parties and represent the many different ideologies, ethnicities and religions throughout Iraq. Several of these parties include groups that are secular; nonsecular; Turkomen; Armenian; Assyrian; as well as non - aligned Shiites and Sunnis. 35 Throughout its brief history, many of these parties have experienced ethnic and sectarian partisanship, some to the point of staging temporary walkouts and boycotts of the legislative process; but ultimately have returned to engage in vigorous and dynamic debate. Moreover, past boycotts such as the one committed by the Sunni IAF in 2006 created a voting imbalance in the parliament that gave the Shii UIA party many advantages in all legislative processes, thus resulting in furthering Sunni – Shii animosity. Many of these parties have strong opposing views on how to govern their society, thereby creating long delays in any legislation process, but recently have managed to set aside many of their rivalries in order to make compromises that have benefited the society.
3B. Executive
The President of Iraq is Jalal Talabani, who is also the secretary general of the PUK. The Prime Minister is Nouri – al – Maliki, who is the leader of the Dawa Party. The President is the Head of State, protecting the Constitution and representing the sovereignty and unity of the state, while the Prime Minister is the direct executive authority and commander in chief. The President and Vice Presidents are elected by the ICR. The Prime Minister is nominated by the largest bloc in the ICR, in this case the UIA. Upon designation, the Prime Minister names the members of his cabinet, the Council of Ministers, which is then approved by the ICR. 36
3C. Judiciary
The Iraqi Judiciary branch is a system upon itself and no other entity has authority over it. It establishes a system based on European civil law coupled with Islamic law that is divided into civil and criminal courts. 37 The highest court of the land, the Iraqi Supreme Court has final authority over all agencies. The judges that make up the Supreme Court are required to be experts in Islamic jurisprudence as well as civil legal scholars. 38 This system of jurisprudence ensures that Islamic Sharia law and civil law are simultaneously adhered too as all laws must pass the strict religious and civil interpretation (or reinterpretation if so required) of the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Conclusions of the Iraqi System
The preceding examination of Iraq´s political system has revealed several important traits that identify it as a legitimate Islamic Democracy. The characterizations of a democracy, as stated from the earlier description (Part I Section 3) have all been attained: legislation enacted by majority rule; protection for the rights of minorities; protection of basic human rights and freedoms; allows for the free and fair election of political representation; protects all citizens and ensures equality before the law; and protects the right of due process of law. Moreover, the Iraqi polity is teeming with numerous political parties, all of varying ethnicities and religious sects offering a legitimate voice of opposition within the system. As previously stated (Part I Section 3), legitimate opposition is also a requirement of a functioning democracy. Without legitimate opposition, the people of the society are marred in a single party system incapable of making any significant changes within their system.
The characterizations of Islamic jurisprudence and application of Islamic law (Sharia) are also preponderant elements within the Iraqi system. The constitution assures that all legislation enacted into law must pass Islamic examination that does not contradict the laws of the Sharia. Islamic Modernists have argued that Islamic reform cannot be achieved without the three basic components of ijtihad (reinterpretation), shura (consultation) and ijma (consensus). Modernists have also urged that the path to a true Islamic Democracy is through observation of these collective practices (Part I, Section 4). In fact, their very definition predisposes a system that is administrated by the people and incorporates the foundations of impartial justice and virtue. These practices also mirror many of the basic discourses found within a functioning democracy.
The Iraqi Constitution has stated that the reinterpretation of Sharia law is one of the core functions of the Iraqi Supreme Court. Moreover, the core function of the Iraqi Council of Representatives is to enact law through the process of consultation and consensus. In many ways the Iraqi polity is similar to that of the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the validity of all laws enacted. It also is called upon to reinterpret the U.S. Constitution in laws that require revising due to ever - evolving questions of legal jurisprudence. Similarly, the U.S. Congress enacts all laws through a process of litigation that is not unlike that of consultation and consensus. The main difference between the two systems is that the Iraqi polity recognizes the significance and values of Islamic law. Without observance of Islamic law, not only would the government lose its legitimacy amongst the ulama and the Muslim world, but more importantly, would also lose legitimacy within its own society that would not consent to any sort of authority without observance of Islamic law.
To further demonstrate Iraq´s desire to adhere to Sharia law, one can view the influence and importance that the Ayatollah Ali al-Hussein al-Sistani has on the Iraqi polity. As Iraq´s leading religious figure, it is vital for the government to receive tacit approval on all actions that concern anything regarding the religious platform, and although not an official member of the government, his decisions and interpretations of the law are critical aspects of Iraqi society. As recently as November of 2008, the ICR´s decision to allow the U.S. forces to remain until 2011 under the Status of Forces Treaty required the review and approval of Ayatollah al – Sistani before the ICR would proceed with their approval process. Even though the approval of this treaty was not under the Ayatollah´s jurisdiction, for the Iraqi people to accept such a treaty, the endorsement of the Ayatollah was crucial for the Iraqi people who would have rejected this treaty if consent were not received. 39
Therefore, according to the definitions and examples provided within this text, the Iraqi system of governance meets all of the standards and qualifications that make up a modern Islamic Democracy. Taking the definition one step farther; since the Iraqi system recognizes the authority of Prime Minister Nouri al – Maliki as the chief executive, the Iraqi system can be more accurately described as an Islamic Democratic Republic.
Part III. Final Thoughts and Analysis of Iraq´s Current Condition
The 2008 version of Iraq has endured many hardships since the toppling of Saddam´s regime. Following the government´s inception in January 2005, there have been many stressors that have endangered the sovereignty and legitimacy of Iraq´s government. Iraq has endured Sunni – Shiite sectarian violence that threatened to break out into a full - out civil war; the Kurdish separatist question continues to threaten to divide the state into an Arab south and a Kurdish north; intra – Shiite rivalry between Muqtada al – Sadr and Prime Minister Nouri al – Maliki threatened to expand into an intra –sectarian conflict; the occupation of Iraqi soil by U.S. forces resulting in the humiliation of Iraqi nationalism; Iranian interference in political and religious matters; and most notably the infusion of foreign fighters and insurgents attempting to ignite an already tense Sunni – Shiite situation aimed at bringing civil unrest within the society.
There have been many moments where it seemed that these stressors would succeed in bringing down the Iraqi system. The government of al – Maliki has been recently very concerned with sectarian and tribal rifts within the ICR that have caused several parties to boycott the democratic process. These secessions would have dealt his government a serious blow to its legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Fortunately, many of these stressors have been diffused through mutual cooperation from the varying ethnicities and religious sects within Iraq. The decrease in sectarian violence has been one of the major factors bringing about increased stability and has resulted in the quelling of the centuries old Shii – Sunni rivalry, both within the general populace and the ICR. The yearning for greater political participation has brought about an elevated cooperation as the Shiite dominated ICR along with Prime Minister al – Maliki have endeavored to unite the society under the banner of a singular Iraqi nation.
Insurgent violence is also on a downward trend as the use of Iraqi nationals as security forces, weary of violence, has produced one of the most extraordinary stories out of Iraq in years. Sunni security organizations such as the Awakening and The Sons of Iraq working in full cooperation with the Shii dominated government have for all intensive purposes subdued the insurgents and foreign fighters that were the catalyst of Sunni – Shii violence. The decline of insurgent activity has significantly reduced overall violence to the point that security for the majority of the territorial provinces has now been assumed by federal Iraqi security forces, thus requiring a significantly less U.S. presence in those areas.
Many critics were also fearful that the Shiite dominated Iraqi government was on the verge of falling under the influence of Iran, making them in effect a client state. However, recent events have demonstrated that Iraq is fully capable of handling its own affairs without interference from Tehran, or even Washington for that matter. Actions such as the approval of the Status of Forces Treaty and the closing of the shared Iran/Iraq border have infuriated Tehran, while simultaneously sending a message to Washington demonstrating Bagdad´s autonomy. The Kurdish separatist movement has been somewhat quelled by allowing the Kurds to govern their own semi - autonomous region in Northern Iraq, however recent incidents demonstrate that the Kurds have been extending their sphere of influence further south into the Kirkuk region in an attempt to control its vast oil resources. Former Baathist insurgents, remnants of Saddam´s regime have abandoned their violent movement, alternatively seeking representation within the Iraqi polity. Even outspoken Mullah Muqtada al – Sadr and his Mahdi Army have resorted to less direct confrontation, preferring instead greater political involvement as the Sadr Movement prepares for the upcoming January 2009 elections.
If one were to take a snapshot of Iraq 2005 – 2007 and compare it with a snapshot of Iraq 2008, the differences would be astounding. Current Iraq has made great strides in matters of society, security and legitimacy. Even fellow Sunni Muslim states, who were once fearful of Iraq´s Shii dominated government and a possible alliance with Iran, have now accepted Iraq into many of its associations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA); Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD); Arab Monetary Fund (AMF); Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU); Arab League (AL); Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the United Nations. These organizations not only have accredited Iraq as a legitimate state, but also have accepted Iraq as part of the Muslim world.
In review of the earlier examinations of Pakistan and Afghanistan (Part I, Section 5), a case study performed on Pakistan and Afghanistan comparable to the one performed on Iraq would reveal for all intensive purposes the same results. All three systems are similar in its observance of Islamic and civil law; all three function under the same set of checks and balances that are required by separation of powers; all three systems of government engage in vigorous and legal oppositional debate; and all three systems observe similar adherence to the three main pillars of modern Islamic reform (reinterpretation, consultation and consensus).
For all their similarities however, there are numerous differences within each society. Iraq´s newborn system has found ways to alleviate foreign insurgency and sectarian violence while reasonably achieving stability. Pakistan and Afghanistan are still struggling with the problem of insurgency as the Taliban and other Islamic militants refuse to capitulate. Iraq´s economy is based on vast amounts of untapped energy and natural resources; Pakistan´s economy though improving, has previously had many years of decline and is based on agriculture and manufacturing, while Afghanistan´s economy continues to be agrarian based. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan struggle with a serious issue of illegal drugs and contraband along with the problems that accompany it, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and smuggling. Pakistan also must deal with the problem of violent separatists in Kashmir, a problem that has recently escalated Pakistan and India´s nuclear rivalry.
Iraq´s system is still in the development stage and is far from perfect. Even though it has dramatically decreased, Iraq still suffers from domestic terrorism from foreign fighters and quite possibly al - Qaeda. The Iraqi government must also deal with Kurdish autonomy that grows stronger every day and seeks to overcome its minority status in Iraqi society as well as in the ICR. However the greatest hindrance to Iraqi autonomy and sovereignty has been the U.S. occupation. The U.S. must step aside and allow the Iraqi´s to assume control of security for all of its provinces. Even though the process of handing over security duties from U.S. hands to Iraqi hands has begun, it must proceed at a swifter pace in order to bring a sense of relief and pride back to the populace. This in turn would aid in bringing about an end to the ongoing violence as insurgents would no longer have an excuse to continue further violence, thus classifying them as criminals not only to society but to Islam as well as their Jihad is no longer required. All of these issues need to be dealt with within the near future, thus allowing the Iraqi government to enforce the rule of civil and Islamic law on a legitimate as well as sovereign platform.
In retrospect, with all of its ongoing problems, Iraq´s system is still developing at a greater rate of acceleration on the social, economic and political level when compared with the systems of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is even quite possible that within another five years, Iraq´s Islamic Democratic Republic could be the model of Islamic governance for all other Muslim states to emulate.
In this new period of Islamic Revivalism, the desire for representation and active participation in one´s own government has never been greater. Authoritative regimes around the globe, one by one are renouncing their systems, giving way to more active participation by the people. The Islamic community is no different when it comes to the desire to be heard in one´s own government. Islamic Democracy has been the evolution of a system of governance that has lasted 1400 years. The Islamic community has not overlooked this fact, as Muslims worldwide will continue to evolve and demand more active political acknowledgement within their governments. Modernists have shown the method of evolution. Now it is up to Muslim authoritative regimes to allow their systems to evolve so that their people can benefit from the advantages of Islamic Democracy.
Notes
1. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 4.
2. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 14, 47.
3. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 27-29.
4. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 193.
Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 58.
5. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 76-79, 90-94.
John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 23.
6. John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 40 -57.
7. State Department Info. America.gov, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm. Dec. 2, 2008.
8. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 36-39.
9. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 39, 46.
Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 44-68.
10. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 95-96.
John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 127.
11. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 97-98.
John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 128-139.
12. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 100-101.
John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 130-131.
13. John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 132-133.
14. Ibid. 137-138.
15. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 237-244.
John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 69-75.
16. The Political Structure of Turkey. Turkish Press, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/Structure.htm. Nov. 20, 2007.
17. U.S. State Department Background Note: Jordan. U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm. Mar. 2008.
18. CIA – The World Factbook. Jordan. Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html#People. Nov. 20, 2008.
19. John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 186-191.
U.S. State Department Background Note: Lebanon. U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm. Oct. 2008.
20. John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 28-30.
21. Mir Zohair Husain. Global Islamic Politics. New York, NY: HarperCollins College, 1995; 28-36.
22. Globalization Security Dilemma: How Globalization will Renew Great Power Competition. Enrique Portaluppi. American Chronicle, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/72870. Sep. 2, 2008.
23. John L. Esposito and John O. Vole. Islam and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996; 17-21.
24. John L. Esposito. Islam, The Straight Path, Third Edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998; 43-44.
25. Seyyed Hossein Nasar. Islam, Religion, History and Civilization. New York, NY: HarperSanFrancisco, 2003; 120-124.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. 130-132.
28. Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O´Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq. National Defense Research Institute, 2-3.
29. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNAM I, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf. 2004-2008.
30. U.S. State Department Background Note: Iraq. U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm. Feb. 2008.
31. Ibid.
32. CIA – The World Factbook. Iraq. Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html. Nov. 20, 2008.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. U.S. State Department Background Note: Iraq. U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm. Feb. 2008.
37. Iraq in Transition. PBS, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/governmentprofile.html. Dec. 20, 2006.
38. Iraqi Constitution. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNAM I, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf. 2004-2008.
39. Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O´Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq. National Defense Research Institute, 12.
Iraq Head, Top Cleric Back 2011 Exit by U.S. Mary Beth Sheridan. Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/15/AR2008111500679.html?wpisrc=newsletter. Nov. 16, 2008.

American Chronicle | The Evolution of Islamic Democracy in the New Iraq