March 21, 2008

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Comment: Responding to Islamophobia —Farish A Noor

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 12:48 pm
Technorati Tags:

Responding to Islamophobia —Farish A Noor

No resolution to the perennial problem of Islamophobia and Muslim-bashing can be reached as long as we react to such slander and bigotry with slander and bigotry of our own
The recent declaration made at the OIC summit that calls for Muslim nation-states to act in a concerted manner and to take legal action against any country, group or individual who deliberately attacks Islam is noteworthy for the seriousness of its intent, but falls short of providing us with a real solution to the problem of racism and prejudice disguised behind the banner of Islam-bashing.
For a start, one wonders if the arena of international law even allows states to take legal action against other actors and agents on such grounds; and one wonders what the modalities of such an action might be. But above all, we need to take a calm and rational distance from the problem itself and consider methods that will work and reject those that certainly won’t.
The problem, however, is this: how can Muslims react rationally and coolly to acts of provocation at a time when even the utterance of the mutest words of protest are deemed by some as the irrational outpourings of misguided pious grief?
The worry that some of us share at the moment is how the Muslims of the world will react to the release of the film produced by Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party. Wilders is known in Holland as a maverick politician on the make, an ambitious demagogue whose tactics are as loud as they are crude. His decision to make a film on the life of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH was calculated to raise the political temperature in Europe at a time when Muslim-non-Muslim relations have hit an all time low.
Unlike the murdered film director Theo van Gogh, who was a left-leaning activist and long-time supporter of minority concerns (and who, incidentally, also defended the rights of Muslim migrants in Holland), Wilders is a far-right politician who is clearly appealing to the baser parochial and exclusive sentiments of white Dutch society.
It would be hypocritical, to say the least, to claim that Wilders’ film which presents Islam as a religious system akin to Fascism and which compares the Prophet Muhammad PBUH to Hitler was meant to bring the communities of Holland closer together.
But in reacting to the film the Muslim community worldwide would have to take into account some cautionary points:
For a start, Geert Wilders happens to be a single individual that happens to lead a relatively small (though growing) political movement. In no way can we say that his is the voice of mainstream Dutch society which has historically been critical of racist demagogues and hate-mongers in its midst.
Furthermore it should be remembered that thousands of Dutch citizens have also been active supporters and defenders of the rights of Muslims elsewhere, and that there are hundreds of Dutch NGOs and citizens groups that have been actively campaigning for the political rights of the Palestinians and the people of Iraq during the recent Gulf War. In condemning Wilders for his racist rant, it is absolutely imperative that the Muslim communities of the world restrain from condemning Dutch society in toto, and Westerners in general.
Secondly it should be noted that any mode of protest has to be measured and has to reflect the true nature of the insult that is perceived. The concern of many Muslim intellectuals and leaders today is that as the protests against Wilders’ film grow across the planet, we will see yet another round of violent demonstrations accompanied by the now-familiar rhetoric of death threats and hate speeches.
When will Muslims realise that reacting to racism and bigotry can only be effective when it is done from a higher moral ground, and not by responding to hate with hate?
To this end, we need to emphasise that Muslims will never occupy the higher moral ground as long as they do not learn to co-operate with other faith communities and realise that our lot is a common one, shared with the rest of humanity. It is therefore vital that any steps taken to respond to the film by Geert Wilders be inclusive and accommodating in character, and that Muslim leaders, intellectuals and activists reach out for support from other faith communities including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and all those who are against all forms of racism and bigotry. Only then will Muslims give the impression that we are not an isolated, marginalised and parochial community driven primarily by our own exclusive sectarian interests.
Lastly, while responding to Wilders’ outlandish and repugnant misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, Muslims also need to be honest enough to recognise the faults and errors in ourselves. To condemn racist non-Muslims who deliberately abuse Islam is one thing, but Muslims also need to do some proper in-house cleaning and recognise that not all is well is the house of Islam: racism, sexism, corruption, nepotism and abuse of power remain pressing realities in so many Muslim countries today.
Likewise the hate-discourse of the likes of Wilders can also be compared to the hate-discourse of many radically violent Muslim demagogues, who do deserve to be called Muslim Fascists too.
Can this dilemma be resolved in time before we witness yet another round of Muslim-West antagonism as we did in the wake of the cartoon controversy of 2004-2005?
One will only know the answer to that question when the controversy has passed and the dust has settled. But one thing is for certain at this juncture: no resolution to the perennial problem of Islamophobia and Muslim-bashing can be reached as long as we react to such slander and bigotry with slander and bigotry of our own. One does not fight hate with hate; and an intelligent, universal, inclusive reaction to the problem of Islamophobia is perhaps the first step to finding a solution.
Let us hope that Muslims will keep their cool this time round.
Dr Farish A Noor is Senior Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and one of the founders of the www.othermalaysia.org research site

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Comment: Responding to Islamophobia —Farish A Noor

Shariah - Muslims - Islamic Law - Islam - Courts - New York Times

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 12:21 pm

 

Why Shariah?

Stephanie Sinclair for The New York Times

The High Court in Cairo. In Egypt, courts must act in accordance with the basic tenets of Islamic jurisprudence.

By NOAH FELDMAN

Published: March 16, 2008

Last month, Rowan Williams, the archbishop of Canterbury, gave a nuanced, scholarly lecture in London about whether the British legal system should allow non-Christian courts to decide certain matters of family law. Britain has no constitutional separation of church and state. The archbishop noted that “the law of the Church of England is the law of the land” there; indeed, ecclesiastical courts that once handled marriage and divorce are still integrated into the British legal system, deciding matters of church property and doctrine. His tentative suggestion was that, subject to the agreement of all parties and the strict requirement of protecting equal rights for women, it might be a good idea to consider allowing Islamic and Orthodox Jewish courts to handle marriage and divorce.

Stephanie Sinclair for The New York Times

The practical application of Shariah in most Muslim countries (as here, in this Egyptian courtroom) is in matters of family law.

Technorati Tags: ,,

Stephanie Sinclair for The New York Times

Then all hell broke loose. From politicians across the spectrum to senior church figures and the ubiquitous British tabloids came calls for the leader of the world’s second largest Christian denomination to issue a retraction or even resign. Williams has spent the last couple of years trying to hold together the global Anglican Communion in the face of continuing controversies about ordaining gay priests and recognizing same-sex marriages. Yet little in that contentious battle subjected him to the kind of outcry that his reference to religious courts unleashed. Needless to say, the outrage was not occasioned by Williams’s mention of Orthodox Jewish law. For the purposes of public discussion, it was the word “Shariah” that was radioactive.

In some sense, the outrage about according a degree of official status to Shariah in a Western country should come as no surprise. No legal system has ever had worse press. To many, the word “Shariah” conjures horrors of hands cut off, adulterers stoned and women oppressed. By contrast, who today remembers that the much-loved English common law called for execution as punishment for hundreds of crimes, including theft of any object worth five shillings or more? How many know that until the 18th century, the laws of most European countries authorized torture as an official component of the criminal-justice system? As for sexism, the common law long denied married women any property rights or indeed legal personality apart from their husbands. When the British applied their law to Muslims in place of Shariah, as they did in some colonies, the result was to strip married women of the property that Islamic law had always granted them — hardly progress toward equality of the sexes.

In fact, for most of its history, Islamic law offered the most liberal and humane legal principles available anywhere in the world. Today, when we invoke the harsh punishments prescribed by Shariah for a handful of offenses, we rarely acknowledge the high standards of proof necessary for their implementation. Before an adultery conviction can typically be obtained, for example, the accused must confess four times or four adult male witnesses of good character must testify that they directly observed the sex act. The extremes of our own legal system — like life sentences for relatively minor drug crimes, in some cases — are routinely ignored. We neglect to mention the recent vintage of our tentative improvements in family law. It sometimes seems as if we need Shariah as Westerners have long needed Islam: as a canvas on which to project our ideas of the horrible, and as a foil to make us look good.

In the Muslim world, on the other hand, the reputation of Shariah has undergone an extraordinary revival in recent years. A century ago, forward-looking Muslims thought of Shariah as outdated, in need of reform or maybe abandonment. Today, 66 percent of Egyptians, 60 percent of Pakistanis and 54 percent of Jordanians say that Shariah should be the only source of legislation in their countries. Islamist political parties, like those associated with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood, make the adoption of Shariah the most prominent plank in their political platforms. And the message resonates. Wherever Islamists have been allowed to run for office in Arabic-speaking countries, they have tended to win almost as many seats as the governments have let them contest. The Islamist movement in its various incarnations — from moderate to radical — is easily the fastest growing and most vital in the Muslim world; the return to Shariah is its calling card.

How is it that what so many Westerners see as the most unappealing and premodern aspect of Islam is, to many Muslims, the vibrant, attractive core of a global movement of Islamic revival? The explanation surely must go beyond the oversimplified assumption that Muslims want to use Shariah to reverse feminism and control women — especially since large numbers of women support the Islamists in general and the ideal of Shariah in particular.

Is Shariah the Rule of Law?

One reason for the divergence between Western and Muslim views of Shariah is that we are not all using the word to mean the same thing. Although it is commonplace to use the word “Shariah” and the phrase “Islamic law” interchangeably, this prosaic English translation does not capture the full set of associations that the term “Shariah” conjures for the believer. Shariah, properly understood, is not just a set of legal rules. To believing Muslims, it is something deeper and higher, infused with moral and metaphysical purpose. At its core, Shariah represents the idea that all human beings — and all human governments — are subject to justice under the law.

In fact, “Shariah” is not the word traditionally used in Arabic to refer to the processes of Islamic legal reasoning or the rulings produced through it: that word is fiqh, meaning something like Islamic jurisprudence. The word “Shariah” connotes a connection to the divine, a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order life in accordance with God’s will. Westerners typically imagine that Shariah advocates simply want to use the Koran as their legal code. But the reality is much more complicated. Islamist politicians tend to be very vague about exactly what it would mean for Shariah to be the source for the law of the land — and with good reason, because just adopting such a principle would not determine how the legal system would actually operate.

Shariah is best understood as a kind of higher law, albeit one that includes some specific, worldly commands. All Muslims would agree, for example, that it prohibits lending money at interest — though not investments in which risks and returns are shared; and the ban on Muslims drinking alcohol is an example of an unequivocal ritual prohibition, even for liberal interpreters of the faith. Some rules associated with Shariah are undoubtedly old-fashioned and harsh. Men and women are treated unequally, for example, by making it hard for women to initiate divorce without forfeiting alimony. The prohibition on sodomy, though historically often unenforced, makes recognition of same-sex relationships difficult to contemplate. But Shariah also prohibits bribery or special favors in court. It demands equal treatment for rich and poor. It condemns the vigilante-style honor killings that still occur in some Middle Eastern countries. And it protects everyone’s property — including women’s — from being taken from them. Unlike in Iran, where wearing a head scarf is legally mandated and enforced by special religious police, the Islamist view in most other Muslim countries is that the head scarf is one way of implementing the religious duty to dress modestly — a desirable social norm, not an enforceable legal rule. And mandating capital punishment for apostasy is not on the agenda of most elected Islamists. For many Muslims today, living in corrupt autocracies, the call for Shariah is not a call for sexism, obscurantism or savage punishment but for an Islamic version of what the West considers its most prized principle of political justice: the rule of law.

The Sway of the Scholars

To understand Shariah’s deep appeal, we need to ask a crucial question that is rarely addressed in the West: What, in fact, is the system of Islamic law? In his lifetime, the Prophet Muhammad was both the religious and the political leader of the community of Muslim believers. His revelation, the Koran, contained some laws, pertaining especially to ritual matters and inheritance; but it was not primarily a legal book and did not include a lengthy legal code of the kind that can be found in parts of the Hebrew Bible. When the first generation of believers needed guidance on a subject that was not addressed by revelation, they went directly to Muhammad. He either answered of his own accord or, if he was unsure, awaited divine guidance in the form of a new revelation.

With the death of Muhammad, divine revelation to the Muslim community stopped. The role of the political-religious leader passed to a series of caliphs (Arabic for “substitute”) who stood in the prophet’s stead. That left the caliph in a tricky position when it came to resolving difficult legal matters. The caliph possessed Muhammad’s authority but not his access to revelation. It also left the community in something of a bind. If the Koran did not speak clearly to a particular question, how was the law to be determined?

The answer that developed over the first couple of centuries of Islam was that the Koran could be supplemented by reference to the prophet’s life — his sunna, his path. (The word “sunna” is the source of the designation Sunni — one who follows the prophet’s path.) His actions and words were captured in an oral tradition, beginning presumably with a person who witnessed the action or statement firsthand. Accurate reports had to be distinguished from false ones. But of course even a trustworthy report on a particular situation could not directly resolve most new legal problems that arose later. To address such problems, it was necessary to reason by analogy from one situation to another. There was also the possibility that a communal consensus existed on what to do under particular circumstances, and that, too, was thought to have substantial weight.

This fourfold combination — the Koran, the path of the prophet as captured in the collections of reports, analogical reasoning and consensus — amounted to a basis for a legal system. But who would be able to say how these four factors fit together? Indeed, who had the authority to say that these factors and not others formed the sources of the law? The first four caliphs, who knew the prophet personally, might have been able to make this claim for themselves. But after them, the caliphs were faced with a growing group of specialists who asserted that they, collectively, could ascertain the law from the available sources. This self-appointed group came to be known as the scholars — and over the course of a few generations, they got the caliphs to acknowledge them as the guardians of the law. By interpreting a law that originated with God, they gained control over the legal system as it actually existed. That made them, and not the caliphs, into “the heirs of the prophets.”

Among the Sunnis, this model took effect very early and persisted until modern times. For the Shiites, who believe that the succession of power followed the prophet’s lineage, the prophet had several successors who claimed extraordinary divine authority. Once they were gone, however, the Shiite scholars came to occupy a role not unlike that of their Sunni counterparts.

Under the constitutional theory that the scholars developed to explain the division of labor in the Islamic state, the caliph had paramount responsibility to fulfill the divine injunction to “command the right and prohibit the wrong.” But this was not a task he could accomplish on his own. It required him to delegate responsibility to scholarly judges, who would apply God’s law as they interpreted it. The caliph could promote or fire them as he wished, but he could not dictate legal results: judicial authority came from the caliph, but the law came from the scholars.

The caliphs — and eventually the sultans who came to rule once the caliphate lost most of its worldly influence — still had plenty of power. They handled foreign affairs more or less at their discretion. And they could also issue what were effectively administrative regulations — provided these regulations did not contradict what the scholars said Shariah required. The regulations addressed areas where Shariah was silent. They also enabled the state to regulate social conduct without having to put every case before the courts, where convictions would often be impossible to obtain because of the strict standards of proof required for punishment. As a result of these regulations, many legal matters (perhaps most) fell outside the rules given specifically by Shariah.

The upshot is that the system of Islamic law as it came to exist allowed a great deal of leeway. That is why today’s advocates of Shariah as the source of law are not actually recommending the adoption of a comprehensive legal code derived from or dictated by Shariah — because nothing so comprehensive has ever existed in Islamic history. To the Islamist politicians who advocate it or for the public that supports it, Shariah generally means something else. It means establishing a legal system in which God’s law sets the ground rules, authorizing and validating everyday laws passed by an elected legislature. In other words, for them, Shariah is expected to function as something like a modern constitution.

The Rights of Humans and the Rights of God

So in contemporary Islamic politics, the call for Shariah does not only or primarily mean mandating the veiling of women or the use of corporal punishment — it has an essential constitutional dimension as well. But what is the particular appeal of placing Shariah above ordinary law?

The answer lies in a little-remarked feature of traditional Islamic government: that a state under Shariah was, for more than a thousand years, subject to a version of the rule of law. And as a rule-of-law government, the traditional Islamic state had an advantage that has been lost in the dictatorships and autocratic monarchies that have governed so much of the Muslim world for the last century. Islamic government was legitimate, in the dual sense that it generally respected the individual legal rights of its subjects and was seen by them as doing so. These individual legal rights, known as “the rights of humans” (in contrast to “the rights of God” to such things as ritual obedience), included basic entitlements to life, property and legal process — the protections from arbitrary government oppression sought by people all over the world for centuries.

Of course, merely declaring the ruler subject to the law was not enough on its own; the ruler actually had to follow the law. For that, he needed incentives. And as it happened, the system of government gave him a big one, in the form of a balance of power with the scholars. The ruler might be able to use pressure once in a while to get the results he wanted in particular cases. But because the scholars were in charge of the law, and he was not, the ruler could pervert the course of justice only at the high cost of being seen to violate God’s law — thereby undermining the very basis of his rule.

In practice, the scholars’ leverage to demand respect for the law came from the fact that the caliphate was not hereditary as of right. That afforded the scholars major influence at the transitional moments when a caliph was being chosen or challenged. On taking office, a new ruler — even one designated by his dead predecessor — had to fend off competing claimants. The first thing he would need was affirmation of the legitimacy of his assumption of power. The scholars were prepared to offer just that, in exchange for the ruler’s promise to follow the law.

Once in office, rulers faced the inevitable threat of invasion or a palace coup. The caliph would need the scholars to declare a religious obligation to protect the state in a defensive jihad. Having the scholars on his side in times of crisis was a tremendous asset for the ruler who could be said to follow the law. Even if the ruler was not law-abiding, the scholars still did not spontaneously declare a sitting caliph disqualified. This would have been foolish, especially in view of the fact that the scholars had no armies at their disposal and the sitting caliph did. But their silence could easily be interpreted as an invitation for a challenger to step forward and be validated.

The scholars’ insistence that the ruler obey Shariah was motivated largely by their belief that it was God’s will. But it was God’s will as they interpreted it. As a confident, self-defined elite that controlled and administered the law according to well-settled rules, the scholars were agents of stability and predictability — crucial in societies where the transition from one ruler to the next could be disorderly and even violent. And by controlling the law, the scholars could limit the ability of the executive to expropriate the property of private citizens. This, in turn, induced the executive to rely on lawful taxation to raise revenues, which itself forced the rulers to be responsive to their subjects’ concerns. The scholars and their law were thus absolutely essential to the tremendous success that Islamic society enjoyed from its inception into the 19th century. Without Shariah, there would have been no Haroun al-Rashid in Baghdad, no golden age of Muslim Spain, no reign of Suleiman the Magnificent in Istanbul.

For generations, Western students of the traditional Islamic constitution have assumed that the scholars could offer no meaningful check on the ruler. As one historian has recently put it, although Shariah functioned as a constitution, “the constitution was not enforceable,” because neither scholars nor subjects could “compel their ruler to observe the law in the exercise of government.” But almost no constitution anywhere in the world enables judges or nongovernmental actors to “compel” the obedience of an executive who controls the means of force. The Supreme Court of the United States has no army behind it. Institutions that lack the power of the sword must use more subtle means to constrain executives. Like the American constitutional balance of powers, the traditional Islamic balance was maintained by words and ideas, and not just by forcible compulsion.

So today’s Muslims are not being completely fanciful when they act and speak as though Shariah can structure a constitutional state subject to the rule of law. One big reason that Islamist political parties do so well running on a Shariah platform is that their constituents recognize that Shariah once augured a balanced state in which legal rights were respected.

From Shariah to Despotism

But if Shariah is popular among many Muslims in large part because of its historical association with the rule of law, can it actually do the same work today? Here there is reason for caution and skepticism. The problem is that the traditional Islamic constitution rested on a balance of powers between a ruler subject to law and a class of scholars who interpreted and administered that law. The governments of most contemporary majority-Muslim states, however, have lost these features. Rulers govern as if they were above the law, not subject to it, and the scholars who once wielded so much influence are much reduced in status. If they have judicial posts at all, it is usually as judges in the family-law courts.

In only two important instances do scholars today exercise real power, and in both cases we can see a deviation from their traditional role. The first is Iran, where Ayatollah Khomeini, himself a distinguished scholar, assumed executive power and became supreme leader after the 1979 revolution. The result of this configuration, unique in the history of the Islamic world, is that the scholarly ruler had no counterbalance and so became as unjust as any secular ruler with no check on his authority. The other is Saudi Arabia, where the scholars retain a certain degree of power. The unfortunate outcome is that they can slow any government initiative for reform, however minor, but cannot do much to keep the government responsive to its citizens. The oil-rich state does not need to obtain tax revenues from its citizens to operate — and thus has little reason to keep their interests in mind.

How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book.

Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state. To placate the scholars, the government kept the Shariah courts running but restricted them to handling family-law matters. This strategy paralleled the British colonial approach of allowing religious courts to handle matters of personal status. Today, in countries as far apart as Kenya and Pakistan, Shariah courts still administer family law — a small subset of their original historical jurisdiction.

Codification signaled the death knell for the scholarly class, but it did not destroy the balance of powers on its own. Promulgated in 1876, the Ottoman constitution created a legislature composed of two lawmaking bodies — one elected, one appointed by the sultan. This amounted to the first democratic institution in the Muslim world; had it established itself, it might have popularized the notion that the people represent the ultimate source of legal authority. Then the legislature could have replaced the scholars as the institutional balance to the executive.

But that was not to be. Less than a year after the legislature first met, Sultan Abdulhamid II suspended its operation — and for good measure, he suspended the constitution the following year. Yet the sultan did not restore the scholars to the position they once occupied. With the scholars out of the way and no legislature to replace them, the sultan found himself in the position of near-absolute ruler. This arrangement set the pattern for government in the Muslim world after the Ottoman empire fell. Law became a tool of the ruler, not an authority over him. What followed, perhaps unsurprisingly, was dictatorship and other forms of executive dominance — the state of affairs confronted by the Islamists who seek to restore Shariah.

A Democratic Shariah?

The Islamists today, partly out of realism, partly because they are rarely scholars themselves, seem to have little interest in restoring the scholars to their old role as the constitutional balance to the executive. The Islamist movement, like other modern ideologies, seeks to capture the existing state and then transform society through the tools of modern government. Its vision for bringing Shariah to bear therefore incorporates two common features of modern government: the legislature and the constitution.

The mainstream Sunni Islamist position, found, for example, in the electoral platforms of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, is that an elected legislature should draft and pass laws that are consistent with the spirit of Islamic law. On questions where Islamic law does not provide clear direction, the democratically chosen legislature is supposed to use its discretion to adopt laws infused by Islamic values.

The result is a profound change in the theoretical structure underlying Islamic law: Shariah is democratized in that its care is given to a popularly elected legislature. In Iraq, for example, where the constitution declares Shariah to be “the source of law,” it is in principle up to the National Assembly to pass laws that reflect its spirit.

In case the assembly gets it wrong, however, the Islamists often recommend the judicial review of legislative actions to guarantee that they do not violate Islamic law or values. What is sometimes called a “repugnancy clause,” mandating that a judicial body overturn laws repugnant to Islam, has made its way into several recent constitutions that seek to reconcile Islam and democracy. It may be found, for example, in the Afghan Constitution of 2004 and the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. (I had a small role advising the Iraqi drafters.) Islamic judicial review transforms the highest judicial body of the state into a guarantor of conformity with Islamic law. The high court can then use this power to push for a conservative vision of Islamic law, as in Afghanistan, or for a more moderate version, as in Pakistan.

Islamic judicial review puts the court in a position resembling the one that scholars once occupied. Like the scholars, the judges of the reviewing court present their actions as interpretations of Islamic law. But of course the judges engaged in Islamic judicial review are not the scholars but ordinary judges (as in Iraq) or a mix of judges and scholars (as in Afghanistan). In contrast to the traditional arrangement, the judges’ authority comes not from Shariah itself but from a written constitution that gives them the power of judicial review.

The modern incarnation of Shariah is nostalgic in its invocation of the rule of law but forward-looking in how it seeks to bring this result about. What the Islamists generally do not acknowledge, though, is that such institutions on their own cannot deliver the rule of law. The executive authority also has to develop a commitment to obeying legal and constitutional judgments. That will take real-world incentives, not just a warm feeling for the values associated with Shariah.

How that happens — how an executive administration accustomed to overweening power can be given incentives to subordinate itself to the rule of law — is one of the great mysteries of constitutional development worldwide. Total revolution has an extremely bad track record in recent decades, at least in majority-Muslim states. The revolution that replaced the shah in Iran created an oppressively top-heavy constitutional structure. And the equally revolutionary dreams some entertained for Iraq — dreams of a liberal secular state or of a functioning Islamic democracy — still seem far from fruition.

Gradual change therefore increasingly looks like the best of some bad options. And most of today’s political Islamists — the ones running for office in Morocco or Jordan or Egypt and even Iraq — are gradualists. They wish to adapt existing political institutions by infusing them with Islamic values and some modicum of Islamic law. Of course, such parties are also generally hostile to the United States, at least where we have worked against their interests. (Iraq is an obvious exception — many Shiite Islamists there are our close allies.) But this is a separate question from whether they can become a force for promoting the rule of law. It is possible to imagine the electoral success of Islamist parties putting pressure on executives to satisfy the demand for law-based government embodied in Koranic law. This might bring about a transformation of the judiciary, in which judges would come to think of themselves as agents of the law rather than as agents of the state.

Something of the sort may slowly be happening in Turkey. The Islamists there are much more liberal than anywhere else in the Muslim world; they do not even advocate the adoption of Shariah (a position that would get their government closed down by the staunchly secular military). Yet their central focus is the rule of law and the expansion of basic rights against the Turkish tradition of state-centered secularism. The courts are under increasing pressure to go along with that vision.

Can Shariah provide the necessary resources for such a rethinking of the judicial role? In its essence, Shariah aspires to be a law that applies equally to every human, great or small, ruler or ruled. No one is above it, and everyone at all times is bound by it. But the history of Shariah also shows that the ideals of the rule of law cannot be implemented in a vacuum. For that, a state needs actually effective institutions, which must be reinforced by regular practice and by the recognition of actors within the system that they have more to gain by remaining faithful to its dictates than by deviating from them.

The odds of success in the endeavor to deliver the rule of law are never high. Nothing is harder than creating new institutions with the capacity to balance executive dominance — except perhaps avoiding the temptation to overreach once in power. In Iran, the Islamists have discredited their faith among many ordinary people, and a similar process may be under way in Iraq. Still, with all its risks and dangers, the Islamists’ aspiration to renew old ideas of the rule of law while coming to terms with contemporary circumstances is bold and noble — and may represent a path to just and legitimate government in much of the Muslim world.

Noah Feldman, a contributing writer for the magazine, is a law professor at Harvard University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. This essay is adapted from his book “The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State,” which will be published later this month.

Next Article in Magazine (3 of 15) »

Shariah - Muslims - Islamic Law - Islam - Courts - New York Times

March 20, 2008

Heraclius — the Roman Emperor was About to Approve Islam in Rome (by Mesbah Uddin) - Media Monitors Network (MMN)

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 5:08 am

 

Heraclius — the Roman Emperor was About to Approve Islam in Rome

by Mesbah Uddin

(Tuesday, March 18, 2008)


“In 628 CE, the Emperor Heraclius was in Jerusalem to celebrating his victory over the Persians. In this well-timed moment, Prophet Muhammad sent him an emissary with a letter that contained an invitation to the Emperor to embrace Islam. After ensuring that Prophet Muhammad was not trying to establish an ancestral kingdom in Arabia, he consoled the emissary with encouraging words and valuable gifts. While this incident of emissary is not seriously upheld by the Western writers, the Catholic Encyclopaedia fairly corroborates some events that echo its effects.”


The scenarios that help us uncover the mysteries of the antiquities surrounding Roman Emperor Heraclius and Islam in Rome, need some tracking of the Christendom. History tells us that the tormenting tentacles of the papacy were in Nicea in 325 CE. In fact it was the Egyptian bishop Athanasius of Alexandria in the Nicene conference visualized Jesus as God and not as a Prophet that the Jewish people were looking forward to having for several centuries. The Bishops under the popes, since then, kept on getting imperial treasury and influence at the courts. The members of the Catholic clergy manipulated political authority. Rampant corruption and immorality swept those lands. Soliciting sexual favours from female penitents allured the clergies for religious power and authority.

Throughout European history, the empowerment of Christendom appears to have exceed over most political entity - democracy or kingdom alike. Even King Henry VIII was refused permission by the pope to divorce his wife. This eventually caused a severe rift in the Catholicism and helped the emergence of the Anglican Church of England, with Roman Catholic in splendour but Protestant in name.

By the end of the 15th century, the papal monasteries and convents turned into the largest landholders of Europe. The splendor of Rome grew immeasurably during the late 1400’s, and 1500’s. In fact, about half or more of France, Germany, Sweden and England had become a part of the Papal splendor and ruling arena.

As recent as the pursuance for reforming Catholicism into the existing Protestant faith, Martin Luther was at the edge of being executed. Frederick, the ruler of Saxony in Germany, was hiding Martin Luther in his palace and protected him from the summon of the pope, known as the Bull. Incidentally, some historical analysts of the present-day’s Islam trace the source of “Fatwa” to the papal ‘Bull’. A papal bull often carried public execution order for heresy. In 1520 the pope issued a Bull that forbade Martin Luther to preach. His books, containing the Christian reform movement, were burned. The ‘Bull’ of Pope Innocent III caused the massacre of 20,000 men, women and children (Albigenses) in France.

Right from the birth of Papacy to until the formation of the Protestant segment of Christianity, the popes were, in reality, more powerful than the emperors themselves. The popes’ jurisdiction, known as Christendom, extended over almost all the empires and kingdoms of Europe. In essence, the delusion of Christendom was a government dedicated to enforcement of the Christianity that was reshaped after the conference of Nicea in 325 CE.

The Jews, with much close perception of God with the Muslims, were viewed by the Medieval Christians as the allies of the Muslims. In fact, during the Arab conquest of Spain, they helped Muslim troops against the Christians. Most often the Jews rejoiced when Christian territory fell into Islamic rulers. While the Jews had difficult socio-economic status in Europe, many Jews held prominent positions in the Ottoman Empire.

Even until the First World War, the Jews had a safe-haven in the Ottoman Empire and not in other parts of Europe. Sultan Bayazid II offered shelters to Jewish refugees. The persecuted Jews of Spain got assurance and hope for their equal well-being along with the Muslims. In 1492 the Sultan ordered the governors of the Ottoman Empire to make easy entrance for the Jews in their provinces and to receive them graciously. Bernard Lewis, a British-American historian and a scholar of Middle Eastern studies, once said: “the Jews were not just permitted to settle in the Ottoman lands, but were encouraged, assisted and sometimes even compelled.” For them, the lands of Islam became the lands of safety.

Having all these events and scenarios in perspective, some analytical historians believe that Emperor Heraclius was fascinated by the idea of one mighty unseen God. In fact it was not Emperor Heraclius alone who had uneasiness in recognising Jesus as God. A few centuries before his time, Porphyry, a third-century philosopher from Tyre proved on the basis of the New Testament, that Jesus did not call himself God and that he preached, not about himself, but about the one God, the God of all. In his book, Adversus Christianos (Against the Christians) he is effectively quoted as having said, “The Gods have proclaimed Christ to have been most pious, but the Christians are a confused and vicious sect.” It was his followers who abandoned his teaching and introduced a new way of their own in which Jesus became the object of worship.

During the days of Prophet Muhammad in Medina, Honorius was selected as the pope of the Vatican, ruling the Christendom in 625 CE. He was informed by Patriarch Sergius of Constantinople that Emperor Heraclius, while visiting Armenia in 622 CE, used an expression to a group of Monophysites of the Severian sect. The Monophysites were then regarded as heretics by all the popes during their times.

The expression meant “One Mighty” of the Incarnate Word. Pope Honorius was aware of the emergence of Islam - believing in “One God”. Consequently, the pope felt that the wisdom of “One God” may soon be strolling into the belief-guidelines of the Emperor Heraclius himself. As the faith of Catholicism was then dwindling and faced chilling questions within itself, Islam appeared as an oversized threat to Christianity.

In 628 CE, the Emperor Heraclius was in Jerusalem to celebrating his victory over the Persians. In this well-timed moment, Prophet Muhammad sent him an emissary with a letter that contained an invitation to the Emperor to embrace Islam. After ensuring that Prophet Muhammad was not trying to establish an ancestral kingdom in Arabia, he consoled the emissary with encouraging words and valuable gifts. While this incident of emissary is not seriously upheld by the Western writers, the Catholic Encyclopaedia fairly corroborates some events that echo its effects.

By about 628 C.E. the followers of Prophet Muhammad had grown much stronger than before. As a result, pope Honorius was not confident of orchestrating a warfare against the Prophet. After all it was not Jerusalem where the pope could have exercised his power of the Bull. The essence of Islamic faith, though not new, had some fundamental concurrence with the leanings of the Emperor Heraclius. Analysing rationally, the Pope rather counted on inducing distrust between Prophet Muhammad and his Jewish clans in Medina who took him as their Messiah.

Jewish traditions, enshrined by the Jewish exegetes tell us: “A Prophet is about to arise; his time draws near. We shall follow him; and then we shall slay our enemies with divine slaughter…” As the non-Jewish people of Yathrib became aware of the Prophet, “They spoke one to another – surely we know that is the same Prophet whom the Jews told us about.”

By about 630, Prophet Muhammad’s defenders had grown even stronger, and in his march towards Mecca he earned the victory. Mecca’s wealthy rulers were then obliged to donate to the well being of its poor for which the Prophet was once banished from Mecca. People in Mecca saw Prophet Muhammad’s strength as the power of his God. They, obviously, saw the other gods as powerless. Intuitively there became a mass euphoria in accepting Islam - the religion with an unseen God.

Towards the end of 638 CE, the Emperor Heraclius had issued an “Ecthesis”, or exposition, counselling all his subjects to submit to “One Mighty” of the Incarnate Word. Undoubtedly this “Ecthesis” to submit to “One Mighty” intimately corroborated the essence that Prophet Muhammad once conveyed to him earlier. Perhaps Emperor Heraclius was about to approve Islamic perception of God in Rome but the time was too short for him to do so as he died in 641 CE - just 9 years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. Besides, the papal powers-tentacles were enormous for the Emperor Heraclius to handle alone.

Howard Zinn, an American writer with expertise in political science, sharply criticised the prevailing obstinacy of the readers in their approach to accepting new views in the age-old events. He wrote: “It is the guardians of the old stories, the orthodox histories, who refuse to widen the spectrum of ideas, to take in new books, new approaches, new information new views of history.”

The flame of rational reasoning brings many myths to their melt-down point. Modern research indicates that the papal connivance undoubtedly tarnished the Judaeo-Islamic relations in Medina. The role of pope Honorius, though evident, was amazingly bypassed in Ibn Ishaq’s history of Islam.

Viewing through Howard Zinn’s approach, Western historians seem to have failed to read the message in between the lines surrounding the consolation that the Emperor Heraclius had offered to the emissary of Prophet Muhammad about Islam. More to the point, why an emperor would give valuable presents to a foreign emissary with conflicting faith unless the message itself concurred with his thought-pattern and was valuable to him?

Sources:

  • The Catholic Encyclopaedia,
  • A History of God - by Karen Armstrong
  • Mankind’s Search for God - by Watchtower Bible and Tract Society
  • Classical Islam, a History 600 -1258 - by G.E. Von Grunebaum
  • A People’s History of the United States - by Howard Zinn
  • Contemporary articles in websites and newsmagazines

Heraclius — the Roman Emperor was About to Approve Islam in Rome (by Mesbah Uddin) - Media Monitors Network (MMN)

March 18, 2008

The Statesman

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 12:58 pm

 

Treading a fine line

Over the past few years considerable attention has been devoted to addressing various issues pertaining to the Muslim community and its religion. The apparent cause for such an interest has been the proliferation of religious fundamentalism that has acquired the nomenclature Islamic Terrorism. In Kolkata, the recent controversy over the book by Taslima Nasreen has brought the issue closer home. There has been much debate, dialogue and analysis of the issue. One good thing emerging from such discussions is the opportunity for a better understanding of Islam by Muslims and especially non-Muslims. It is still very unfortunate that I face situations where I have had to rectify that Bengali and Muslim are not mutually exclusive. I am both Bengali and Muslim.
Fundamentalism as commonly understood has to be denounced in all forms, colours and hues. However, the issue involving violent protests over Taslima Nasreen cannot be adequately understood through the frame of fundamentalist attack on literary freedom. Kolkata has an approximately 27 per cent Muslim population (roughly three million, the corollary of West Bengal) and only a miniscule participated in the rampage that followed after Nasreen’s book. Although I was not among them, I share their feeling of disgust and choler against Nasreen. She is known for her candid, critical and anti-religious stance. As an author she has creative freedom. But however creative or literary, freedom cannot be a granted license to write whatever one wants without respect for social-political-cultural norms.
I understand that my opinion treads a fine line between freedom and un-freedom. The same arguments are used by religious bigots to assert their claims and subvert freedom of expression. Yet it must be kept in mind that contested claims become meaningful only when they have some social relevance. But writing debased articles about the Prophet who is revered by all Muslims has no contemporary relevance. Nasreen is no scholar of history or Islam and has no specialised knowledge or academic skill to criticise historical and religious figures. Preconceived interpretation and highly selective manipulative referencing can present arguments but never the truth.
Although Nasreen has been writing for quite some time, one cannot recall widespread and violent protest against her in Kolkata, apart from a few fanatics. The sizeable Muslim community of Kolkata did not restrict her freedom or challenge it. However, when she writes heinous and false facts about the most revered figure of Islam she takes her literary license just too far. I do not endorse religious fanaticism or communal bias. All I intend to say is that criticism of religion and criticism of practices in the name of religion are not the same. Moreover, any criticism should always bear in mind that such criticisms must be sensitive, logical, and, foremost, reasonable.
Well, I do not intend to write about Nasreen’s writing as there is a greater issue in hand. She does not deserve the kind of attention she elicits now. Coming back, the issue of fundamentalism and Islam occupies a central position in contemporary discussions. Islam is criticised as a stagnant religion which has an intrinsic fundamentalist nature. However such an argument is flawed on two grounds: logical fallacy and interpretative fallacy. Any religion is susceptible to criticism on two grounds: 1) the belief system, ie the fundamental tenets, being incompatible with other normative systems; and 2) practices that are based on religion and, at times, may not subscribe to identical expressions being culturally and socially influenced.
Islam is a comprehensive religion. It can be viewed as socio-political-economic religious ideology. Islam prescribes five fundamental tenets that must be subscribed to by all Muslims. Islam (Hadith) prescribes the mode of behaviour, conduct to be followed by the ummah (followers). For example, the Hadith prescribes a certain mode of dressing, certain mode of economic activity, certain model of criminal punishment, certain mode of statecraft, and so on. However, the latter part is prescribed but not always followed by many Muslims because these do not constitute an absolutely necessary attribute. Here cultural and social norms play a dominant role. That is why Muslims across India differ in their social cultural norms and across the world there exists heterogeneity. We must be aware that culture and religion are not the same and both have influence on human action.
The tendency to criticise Islam as an inward looking, stagnant religion is an example of logical fallacy. It is argued that most religions change with time but Islam is caught in a time warp. In fact, religions of the world such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam have all stayed largely the same in terms of their principles through the ages. Protestantism, which emerged as a protest movement within Christianity, was a movement to reform the Church and not Christian principles. The changes in Hinduism are more in terms of practice than in terms of scriptures. This can be attributed to the nature of Hinduism which is a socio-religious ideology characterised by a multiplicity of scriptures, deities and preachers. Religion is a matter of belief. Just as one is free to believe, one is free not to believe.
Coming to the issue of interpretative fallacy, religious practices or actions constitute the most important artifact of investigation. In general, Muslims are considered more religious than other communities. Muslims in India or Bengal are economically, socially backward. Much of the cause for such backwardness has been attributed to Islam without a clear cut concept about underdevelopment. Writers like Nasreen promote such misunderstanding.
There are two aspects that require elaboration. First, practices justified in the name of religion are not always strictly according to scripture. Many a time cultural and social norms play an important part. To confuse religious percepts with social customs is fallacious. There is much criticism of Islam being fundamentalist, being oppressive to women, minorities, etc. It is not possible to deal with all the questions in this article yet I would like to point out how Islam is misinterpreted by some non-Muslims and Muslims. It is commonly argued that Islam treats women as inferior. However, there are abundant examples in the Koran which clearly elaborate that womean are never inferior to men, they are just different. The Koran 4:124 states, “But the believers who do good works, whether men or women, shall enter the gardens of Paradise. They shall not suffer the least injustice.” In Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al Adab 4/337, the Prophet Muhammad says, “If a man to whom a girl is born neither buries her alive, humiliates her, nor gives his sons preference over her, he will be allowed to enter heaven by God, as a reward.” (This was 1,400 years ago in the so called Dark Ages.) Similarly, in Islam all Muslims are treated as equal and it is the duty of Muslims to help their brethren. Similarly, Islam gives very high priority to knowledge. It is well known that the first university in the world (Cordova University in Spain) was established by Arab Muslims. Amartya Sen’s Identity and Violence presents a telling account of how Arab Muslims were instrumental in a way in bringing about the reformation in Europe. If Muslims fail to stick to the principles of Islam, is the religion to be blamed? Moreover, there occurs a serious error in analysis when such portions are ignored in the interpretation of Islam.
To argue that social backwardness has a certain religious cause is certainly most illogical and fallacious. It hinges on certain Weberian logic (Protestant ethics) that religion and culture are all too same. Religion and social-cultural norms are different even though they overlap on many occasions. The simple example of Muslim Bangladesh seceding from Muslim Pakistan on the ground of culture presents my case. Muslim backwardness in India is not due to religious belief but due to other socio-economic cultural reasons. It is the lack of economic, educational and social opportunity that leads to the backwardness of people and communities. That is why a non-Bengali Muslim slum in Kidderpore bears a resemblance to a non-Bengali Hindu slum in Kankinara. The quests for education, lifestyle, inter-personal norms are more a question of culture than religion for ordinary Muslims. Muslims are inward looking not because they follow Islam. Poverty and lack of education are good starting points and they are not caused by religion but by other historical factors.
For example, historically Muslims in India are academically backward. The other religious communities of India, during colonial rule, adopted colonial education much earlier than the Muslims who distanced themselves from the colonial rulers in the initial phase. Most established historians like Sumit Sarkar and Bipan Chandra point out the stern attitude of the Britishers towards Muslims in the initial phase who held the community as conspiring against English rule during 1857 and the early part of the 19th century. This educational backwardness had a spiralling effect on the overall development of the community.
There exists a problem in most of the approaches to address the backwardness afflicting the Muslim community. Muslims are stereotyped in a particular manner. However, a look into India’s history or present would elaborate that Muslims are not one singular lump of humanity. Most analyses of the Muslim question suffers from certain stereotypes that categorises the entire Muslim identity as one. To elucidate my point, let us consider the most dominant representation of Muslims in Bollywood films. It is the underworld criminal or terrorist, subaltern destitute or honest police officer. The identity of ordinary common Muslims, which is vastly greater than standard stereotypes, somehow escapes imagery. The moot point that is glossed over in such stereotyping is that there exists diversity in the socio-economic political situation among Muslims. It is to be borne in mind that as a religious group Muslims share a similar identity but as a social group they are disparate like any other community. As such, the problem has to be addressed according to specificity.
The issue is not of religion but of social, economic opportunity and upliftment. Here educated, enlightened, progressive Muslims have to come up in greater numbers to help the community. Even the Al Koran mentions in sura Radh that Allah does not help those groups or communities who do not help themselves. The Muslim question in India is both a class and a cultural question. The issue of correct understanding of Islam is something that Muslims must strive for from within.
People like Nasreen who criticise religion and its tenets without doing anything for the community in a constructive manner do not help the cause. One must also remember that Muslim identity creation is also a response to social perception. Material reality of the majority of Muslims and social psychology of both Muslims and especially non-Muslims are important considerations where the Muslim question no longer remains exclusively Muslim but becomes a broader social concern.
Let me conclude with an example. Madrasas have often been pointed out as being on the bottom of the institutional knowledge chain. Well, madrasas are indeed at the bottom of the structure and immediate reforms are required. However, many people are ignorant that senior madrasas are under the Madrasa Board (now Aleya University) which imparts formal education along with Arabic knowledge. If for the backward conditions of the village schools the government is held responsible, for the condition of madrasas, how come the Muslims are solely responsible?
(The author is lecturer, SA Jaipuria College, Kolkata.)

The Statesman

Global Politician - The Truth About Islam in Europe

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 12:56 pm

March 17, 2008

Freedom and Islam - By T. O. Shanavas, M. D.

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 12:12 pm

 

Freedom and Islam
By T. O. Shanavas, M. D., Vice President,  Islamic Research Foundation International, Inc.

Recently, I read an article, “Women in Islam” describing the liberation of women by Islam and Prophet (s). In reality women cannot travel alone to Hujj or visit Mecca (the safest place for any one), and women cannot drive a car in Saudi Arabia. It is not a secret that Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular in the world are the least free and least educated. So, I wonder: Oh Islam! You are a great theory but no practical value, unless you live in the West.

After all, only one thing matters in Islam. Faith is a matter of exclusively personal and private experience. We embrace faith individually just as we confront our death individually. An Iranian Muslim philosopher, Souroush, correctly said it that we have communal actions and but not communal faiths. We can express faith in public but the core of the faith is mysteriously private. The preeminence of Islamic faith is for the hereafter where people are judged individually: “Everyone of them will come before Him all alone on the Day of Resurrection. Surely A-Rahman will show love for those who believe and do right.” [19:95-96]. There is no Original Sin that transcends over the goodness of whole mankind in Islam. Therefore, the only things that matter on the Day of Judgment are actions at the individual level. Community actions are useless.

Similarly, the Qur’an states: “Say (Muhammad it is) truth from the Lord of you all. Whosoever will, let him believe and whosoever will, let him disbelieve” (Koran 18: 29) “And so, [O Prophet,] exhort them; thy task is only to exhort: thou cannot compel them to believe.” (Koran: 21-22). “O Prophet.!…Thy duty is not more than to deliver the message; and the reckoning is Ours.” (Koran 13:40). These verses teach that a roof made out safety and liberty is an absolute necessity to develop faith in the hearts. These verses demand Muslims to guarantee freedom and safety for all. Therefore, if governments, Imams, enforced Fatwas, demand any public or outward obedience and submission, such outward appearance is not faith. When law, power, force, and tyranny enforce religion, they are taking control of the body not the soul. Unfortunately, many Muslims want to make reign over body the most important tenet of Islam even though the Qur’an rejects their craving for power over body: “It is not your meat or blood that reach God: It is fealty of your heart that reaches Him” (22:37).

In Muslim-majority nations, people are forced to confess Islamic faith and behave in one voice in religion; but they forget that the rulers cannot fill the heart with genuine faith. I believe that faith chosen freely at the individual level without coercion and without forced conformity is the genuine faith. In a world where the hearts with freely chosen faith, not by forced compliance, pervade, the true religious spirit come alive to establish an ideal society by free choice of the people. This is proven by Muslim history in the first 6 centuries. Muslims helped Jews to create their Golden Age and liberate Christians from tyranny of Roman church. Muslims philosophy and science promoted the Enlightenment and Renaissance of the Europe. We also created the experimental science. In those days, we educated anyone who came our way without force-feeding our faith. Now we have governments that have taken control of our body claiming to send our “meat and blood” to God while Muslims have to beg from non-Muslim societies for their daily bread to keep their body alive.

Prophet Mohammed struggled to establish a free society. Similarly, Muslims must struggle hard peacefully to establish a free society where no totalitarian government, no Imams, no predominant group control us or decide for us. Everyone is equal. If any one wants to be a believer, let him/her be. If anyone wants to be an apostate let him/her be safe to live the life of an apostate. So-called Islamic government is myth created by power-hungry people to control Muslim mind and body. There was no such thing as Islamic government. Government is only a means to execute the will of people. The individual members of the government can have Islamic values and faith. Prophet Mohammed ruled as a democratically elected ruler following the invitation by the people of Medina. He never forced a decision upon his community even when he believed that majority decision on a particular secular matter was a mistake as happened in the case of the disaster of Uhud war. A minority including him wanted to fortify the Medina and fight the Meccan forces. But he agreed to go along with the wishes of the majority to fight the Koreish in the open instead of from fortified Medina even though the strategy of the majority was wrong in his opinion. So, Islam demands Democracy, not tyranny by ullamahs, kings, self-appointed presidents, and military generals.

The concept of so-called Islamic government is an oxymoron unless it means a government with Islamic values that the community has accepted, not by the opinion or fatawa of an Imam but by totally free discussion in a free press, without coercion and intimidation. Some of the so-called Islamic values that exist in contemporary Muslim society are the values of some Imams that had never grinded through and experienced a free press. The self-righteous terrorists, and oppressive governments among Muslims want to control the “meat and blood” with the aid of the values of Imams that were not debated in the free society with a free press. However, they neglect the soul that sustains the body. Let democracy rule our bodies with a free press and let the free choice build our faith. Let us get rid of from our thoughts the enforced forms of outward Islam that demand the conformity and control from our “meat and blood”

The verse 33:5 states: “There is no sin upon you for what mistakes you commit unintentionally, but there is sin what your hearts have intended.” Unintentional mistakes happen much less if mind is exposed to free press, public opinion, and dialogue with reason as guiding principle. A hadith states “God has not created any thing better than reason.” So, any Muslims who oppose a free press and reasoning are committing a sin knowingly because he/she refuses to listen to the merit or demerit of opposing points of view. The Koreish of Mecca rejected Prophet Mohammed because they refused to listen to reasoning. Muslims must reject the Jahilliyah paradigm that pervades in our community and in our mind.

Let Imams and scholars issue fatwas freely without power to enforce over the community. Reject any conformity by force. Reject totalitarianism and kingdoms that want to rule our body. Let the heart and mind fly free to see what is out there. Democracy draws inspiration from the Qur’anic axiom that human being are free. The American constitution reflects it as it states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press.”

This is candidly stated in verse: “We sent down the Torah which contains guidance and light…Later, in the train of prophets We sent Jesus, son of Mary, confirming the Torah which has been send down before him, and gave him the Gospel containing guidance and light. …Unto to you [O Muhammad] this writ (Koran) and a way and a pattern of life, confirming what were revealed before…Unto everyone of you have We appointed a different law and way of life. And if God had so willed He could surely have you all made one single community professing one faith. But He wished to try you and test you. So try to excel in good deeds” (Koran: 5:44-48).

The existence of different kinds of faith and religion competing each other doing good work is the will of God. So, freedom without the enforcement of conformity in religious matters is Islamic. The so-called Islamic governments of the self-righteous violate Qur’anic principles and tyrannize people of all faith including Muslims. Islam will always remain a dream and an excellent theory with no practical value until faith rules the hearts and liberal democracy with a free press rules the bodies. Finally, I thank God for creating America where I do not fear about government taking control of my body and at same time my heart can fly freely to choose my faith.

Freedom and Islam - By T. O. Shanavas, M. D.

The Reform Islam Needs by James Q. Wilson, City Journal Autumn 2002

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 5:47 am

 

The Reform Islam Needs
James Q. Wilson

Technorati Tags:

We are engaged in a struggle to defeat terrorism. I have no advice on how to win that struggle, but I have some thoughts as to why it exists. It is not, I think, because Islam is at war with the West or because Palestinians are trying to displace Israelis. The struggle exists, I think, because the West has mastered the problem of reconciling religion and freedom, while several Middle Eastern nations have not. The story of that mastery and that failure occupies several centuries of human history, in which one dominant culture, the world of Islam, was displaced by a new culture, that of the West.

Reconciling religion and freedom has been the most difficult political task most nations have faced. It is not hard to see why. People who believe that there is one set of moral rules superior to all others, laid down by God and sometimes enforced by the fear of eternal punishment, will understandably expect their nation to observe and impose these rules; to do otherwise would be to repudiate deeply held convictions, offend a divine being, and corrupt society. This is the view of many Muslims; it was also the view of Pope Leo XIII—who said in 1888 that men find freedom in obedience to the authority of God—and of the provost of Oriel College, Oxford, who wrote to a faculty member in 1848 that “you were not born for speculation” but to “serve God and serve man.” If you think that there is one God who expects people to confess beliefs, say prayers, observe fasts, and obtain sacraments, it would be impious, indeed scandalously wrong, to permit the state to ignore beliefs, prayers, fasts, and sacraments.

In furtherance of these views, Queen Mary executed 300 Protestants, England and France expelled Jews, Ferdinand and Isabella expelled from Spain both Moors and Jews, the Spanish Inquisition tortured and executed a few thousand alleged heretics, and books were destroyed and scholars threatened for advancing theologically incorrect theories.

During this time, Islam was a vast empire stretching from western Africa into India—an empire that valued learning, prized scholars, maintained great libraries, and preserved the works of many ancient writers. But within three centuries, this greatest civilization on the face of the earth was in retreat, and the West was rising to produce a civilization renowned for its commitment to personal liberty, scientific expertise, political democracy, and free markets.

Freedom of conscience has made the difference. In an old world where knowledge came from libraries, and scientific experiments were rare, freedom would not be so important. But in the new world, knowledge and all that it can produce come from the sharp challenge of competing ideas tested by standards of objective evidence. In Istanbul, Muslims printed no book until 1729, and thereafter only occasionally. By contrast, the West became a world in which books were published starting three centuries earlier and where doubt and self-criticism were important. Of course, doubt and self-criticism can become, as William Bennett has observed, a self-destructive fetish, but short of that calamity, they are the source of human progress.

The central question is not why freedom of conscience failed to come to much of Islam but why it came at all to the West. Though Westerners will conventionally assign great weight to the arguments made by the defenders of freedom, I do not think that the ideas of Milton, Locke, Erasmus, and Spinoza—though important—were decisive.

What made religious toleration and later freedom of conscience possible in England was not theoretical argument but political necessity. It was necessary, first in England and later in America and much of Europe, because rulers trying to govern nations could not do so without granting freedom to people of different faiths. In the words of Herbert Butterfield, toleration was “the last policy that remained when it had proved impossible to go on fighting any longer.”

The fighting occurred because different religions struggled to control nations. Here lay the chief difference between Islam and the West: Islam was a land of one religion and few states, while the West was a land of many states that were acquiring many religions. In the sixteenth century, people in England thought of themselves chiefly as Englishmen before they thought of themselves as Protestants, and those in France saw themselves as Frenchmen before they saw themselves as Catholics. In most of Islam—in Arabia and northern Africa, certainly—people saw themselves as Muslims before they thought of themselves as members of any state; indeed, states hardly existed in this world until European colonial powers created them by drawing somewhat arbitrary lines on a map.

The Muslim faith was divided into the Sunni and the Shiite; but Christianity was soon divided into four branches. The Protestant Reformation created not only Lutheranism but its archrival, Calvinism, which now joined the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches.

Lutherans, like Catholics, were governed by a priesthood, but Calvinists were ruled by congregations, and so they proclaimed not only a sterner faith but a distinctive political philosophy. The followers of Luther and Calvin had little interest in religious liberty; they wanted to replace a church they detested with one that they admired. But in doing so, they helped bring about religious wars. Lutheran mobs attacked Calvinist groups in the streets of Berlin, and thousands of Calvinists were murdered in the streets of Paris. In 1555, the Peace of Augsburg settled the religious wars briefly with the phrase cuius regio, eius religio—meaning that people in each state or principality would have the religion of their ruler. If you didn’t like your prince’s religion, you had to move somewhere else.

But the problem grew worse as more dissident groups appeared. To the quarrels between Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans were added challenges from Anabaptists, Quakers, and Unitarians. These sects had their own passionate defenders, and they helped start many struggles. And so wars broke out again, all advancing religious claims overlaid with imperial, dynastic, and material objectives.

In France, Catholics killed 20,000 Huguenots, 3,000 in Paris alone. When the Peace of Westphalia settled the wars of the sixteenth century in 1648, it reaffirmed the old doctrine of following the religion of your ruler, but added an odd new doctrine that required some liberty of conscience. As C. V. Wedgwood put it, men had begun to grasp “the essential futility of putting the beliefs of the mind to the judgment of the sword.”

In England, people were both exhausted by war and worried about following a ruler’s orders on matters of faith. Oliver Cromwell, the leader of the successful Presbyterian revolt against the king, was a stern believer in his own faith, but he recognized that his beliefs alone would not enable him to govern; he had to have allies of other faiths. He persuaded Parliament to allow liberty “to all who fear God,” provided they did not disturb the peace, and he took steps to readmit Jews into the country and to moderate attacks on the Quakers.

When Cromwell’s era ended and Charles II took the throne, he brought back with him his Anglican faith, and challenged this arrangement. After he died, James II came to the throne and tried to reestablish Roman Catholicism. When William of Orange invaded the country from Holland in 1688, James II fled, and in time William and his wife, Mary, became rulers. Mary, a Protestant, was the daughter of James II, a Catholic. A lot of English people must have wondered how they were supposed to cope with religious choice if a father and daughter in the royal family could not get the matter straight.

The following year, Parliament passed the Toleration Act, allowing dissident Protestant sects to practice their religion. Their members still could not hold government office, but at least they would not be hanged. The Toleration Act did not help Catholics and Unitarians, but as is so often the case in British law, their religious practices, while not protected by formal law, were allowed by administrative discretion.

Even so, the idea of a free conscience did not advance very much; after all, “toleration” meant that a preferred or established religion, out of its own kindness, allowed other religions to exist—but not to do much more. And William’s support for the Toleration Act probably had a lot to do with economic motives. Tolerance, he is supposed to have said, was essential to commercial success: England would acquire traders, including many Jews, from nations that still practiced persecution.

The Toleration Act began a slow process of moderating the political impact of organized religion. Half a century before it was passed, Galileo, tried by the Roman Inquisition for believing that Earth moved around the Sun, was sentenced to house arrest. But less than a century after the law was adopted, Adam Smith wrote a much praised book on morality that scarcely mentioned God, and less than a century after that, Charles Darwin published books that denied God a role in human evolution, a claim that profoundly disturbed his religious critics but neither prevented his books from being wildly popular nor deterred the Royal Society of London from bestowing on him its royal medal.

Toleration in the American colonies began slowly but accelerated rapidly when our country had to form a nation out of diverse states. The migration of religious sects to America made the colonies a natural breeding ground for religious freedom, but only up to a point. Though Rhode Island under the leadership of Roger Williams had become a religiously free colony, six colonies required their voters to be Protestants, four asked citizens to believe in the divine inspiration of the Bible, one required belief in the Trinity and two in heaven and hell, and five had an officially established church. Massachusetts was a theocracy that punished (and on a few occasions executed) Quakers. Maryland was created as a haven for Catholics, but their freedom began to evaporate as Protestants slowly gained the upper hand.

America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had many religions and some tolerance for dissenting views, but not until the colonists tried to form a national union did they squarely face the problem of religious freedom. The 13 colonies, in order to become a nation, had to decide how to manage the extraordinary diversity of the country. The colonists did so largely by writing a constitution that was silent on the question of religion, except to ban any “religious test” as a requirement for holding federal office.

When the first Congress adopted the Bill of Rights, it included the odd and much disputed ban on passing a law “respecting an establishment of religion.” The meaning of that phrase is a matter of scholarly speculation. James Madison’s original proposal was that the First Amendment ban “any national religion,” and in their first drafts the House and Senate agreed. But when the two branches of Congress turned over their slightly different language to a conference committee, its members, for reasons that no one has satisfactorily explained, chose to ban Congress from passing a law “respecting” a religion.

The wall between church and state, as Jefferson called it in a letter he wrote many years later, turned out to be controversial and porous, as Philip Hamburger’s masterful new book, The Separation of Church and State, shows. But it did guarantee that in time American politics would largely become a secular matter. And that is the essence of the issue. Politics made it necessary to establish free consciences in America, just as it had in England. This profound change in the relationship between governance and spirituality was greatly helped by John Locke’s writings in England and James Madison’s in America, but I suspect it would have occurred if neither of these men had ever lived.

There is no similar story to be told in the Middle Eastern parts of the Muslim world. With the exception of Turkey (and, for a while, Lebanon), every country there has been ruled either by a radical Islamic sect (as with the Taliban in Afghanistan and the mullahs in Iran) or by an autocrat who uses military power to enforce his authority in a nation that could not separate religion and politics or by a traditional tribal chieftain, for whom the distinction between church and state was meaningless. And the failure to make a theocracy work is evident in the vast popular resistance to the Taliban and the Iranian mullahs.

But where Muslims have had to end colonial rule and build their own nation, national identity has trumped religious uniformity. When the Indonesians threw off Dutch rule and later struggled to end communist influence, they did so in a way that made the creation and maintenance of an Indonesian nation more important than religious or political identity. India, home to more Muslims than much of the Middle East, also relied on nationalism and overcoming British rule to insist on the creation of one nation. Its constitution prohibits discrimination based on religion and promises the free exercise of religious belief.

In the Middle East, nations are either of recent origin or uncertain boundaries. Iraq, once the center of great ancient civilizations, was conquered by the Mongols and the Ottoman Turks, then occupied by the British during the First World War, became a League of Nations protectorate, was convulsed by internal wars with the Kurds, torn apart by military coups, and immersed in a long war with Iran. Syria, a land with often-changing borders, was occupied by an endless series of other powers—the Hittites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Ottoman Turks, and the French. After Syria became a self-governing nation in 1944, it was, like Iraq, preoccupied with a series of military coups, repeated wars with Israel, and then, in 1991, with Iraq. Meanwhile, Lebanon, once part of Syria, became an independent nation, though it later fell again under Syrian domination.

These countries today are about where England was in the eleventh century, lacking much in the way of a clear national history or stable government. To manage religion and freedom, they have yet to acquire regimes in which one set of leaders could be replaced in an orderly fashion with a new set, an accomplishment that in the West required almost a millennium. Though many Middle Eastern countries are divided between two Muslim sects, the Sunni and the Shiites, coping with this diversity has so far been vastly less important than the still-incomplete task of finding some basis for asserting and maintaining national government.

Moreover, the Muslim religion is quite different from Christianity. The Qur’an and the hadith contain a vast collection of sacred laws, which Muslims call shari’a, that regulates many details of the public as well as private lives of believers. It sets down rules governing charity, marriage, orphans, fasting, gambling, vanity, pilgrimages, infidelity, polygamy, incest, divorce, modesty, inheritances, prostitution, alcohol consumption, collecting interest, and female dress.

By contrast, the Christian New Testament has rather few secular rules, and these are best remembered as a reaffirmation of the Ten Commandments as modified by the Sermon on the Mount. One can grasp the whole of Jesus’ moral teachings by recalling only two things: love God, and love your neighbor as yourself.

As Bernard Lewis has pointed out, the differences between the legal teachings of the two religions may have derived from, and were certainly reinforced by, the differences between Muhammad and Jesus. In the seventh century, Muhammad was invited to rule Medina and then, after a failed effort to conquer Mecca, finally entered that city as its ruler. He was not only a prophet but also a soldier, judge, and governor. Jesus, by contrast, was an outsider, who neither conquered nor governed anyone, and who was put to death by Roman rulers. Christianity was not recognized until Emperor Constantine adopted it, but Muhammad, in Lewis’s words, was his own Constantine.

Jesus asked Christians to distinguish between what belonged to God and what belonged to Caesar. Islam made no such distinction; to it, Allah prescribed the rules for all of life, encompassing what we now call the religious and the secular spheres. If a Christian nation fails, we look to its political and economic system for an explanation, but when a Muslim state fails, it is only because, as V. S. Naipaul put it, “men had failed the faith.” Disaster in a Christian nation leads to a search for a new political form; disaster in a Muslim one leads to a reinvigoration of the faith.

Christianity began as a persecuted sect, became a tolerated deviance, and then joined with political powers to become, for well over a thousand years, an official religion that persecuted its rivals. But when officially recognized religions stood in the way of maintaining successful nations, Christianity slipped back to what it had once been: an important faith without political power. And in these extraordinary changes, little in the religion was altered, because almost none of it imposed secular rules.

Judaism differs from Christianity in that it supplies its followers with a religious doctrine replete with secular rules. In the first five books of the Bible and in the Talmud, many of these rules are set forth as part of a desire, as stated in Exodus, to create “a holy nation” based on a “kingdom of priests.” In the five books of Moses and the Talmud are rules governing slavery, diet, bribery, incest, marriage, hygiene, and crime and punishment. And many of the earliest Jewish leaders, like Muhammad later, were political and military leaders. But as Daniel Pipes has noted, for two millennia Jews had no country to rule and hence no place in which to let religion govern the state. And by the time Israel was created, the secular rules of the Old Testament and the desire to create “a holy nation” had lost their appeal to most Jews; for them, politics had simply become a matter of survival. Jews may once have been attracted to theocracy, but they learned from experience that powerful states were dangerous ones.

Like the Old Testament, the Qur’an is hard to interpret. One can find phrases that urge Muslims to “fight and slay the pagans” and also passages that say there should be “no compulsion in religion.” The Arabic word jihad means “striving in the path of God,” but it can also mean a holy war against infidels and apostates.

Until the rise of modern Islamic fundamentalism, there were efforts by many scholars to modernize the Qur’an by emphasizing its broadest themes more than its narrow rules. Fazlur Rahman, a leading Islamic scholar, sought in the late 1970s and early 1980s to establish a view of the Qur’an based on Muhammad’s teaching that “differences among my community are a source of blessing.” The basic requirement of the Qur’an, Rahman wrote, is the establishment of a social order on a moral foundation that would aim at the realization of egalitarian values. And there is much in the Qur’an to support this view: it constrained the rules permitting polygamy, moderated slavery, banned infanticide, required fair shares for wives and daughters in bequests, and allowed slaves to buy their freedom—all this in the name of the central Islamic rule: command good and forbid evil.

But many traditional Islamic scholars insist that only the shari’a can govern men, even though it is impossible to manage a modern economy and sustain scientific development on the basis of principles set down in the seventh century. Bernard Lewis tells the story of a Muslim, Mirza Abu Talib, who traveled to England in the late eighteenth century. When he visited the House of Commons, he was astonished to discover that it debated and promulgated laws and set the penalties for criminals. He wrote back to his Muslim brethren that the English, not having accepted the divine law, had to make their own.

Of course, Muslim nations do legislate, but in many of them it is done furtively, with jurists describing their decisions as “customs,” “regulations,” or “interpretations.” And in other nations, the legislature is but an amplification of the orders of a military autocrat, whose power, though often defended in religious terms, comes more from the barrel of a gun than from the teachings of the prophet.

All this makes even more remarkable the extraordinary transformation of Turkey from the headquarters of the Ottoman Empire to the place where Muslims are governed by Western law. Mustafa Kemal, now known as Atatürk, came to power after the First World War as a result of his success in helping defeat the British at Gallipoli and attacking other invading forces. For years, he had been sympathetic to the pro-Western views of many friends; when he became leader of the country, he argued that it could not duplicate the success of the West simply by buying Western arms and machines. The nation had to become Western itself.

Over the course of a decade or so, Atatürk proclaimed a new constitution, created a national legislature, abolished the sultan and caliph, required Muslims to pray in Turkish and not Arabic, urged the study of science, created a secular public education system, abolished religious courts, imposed the Latin alphabet, ended the practice of allowing divorce simply at the husband’s request, gave women the vote, adopted the Christian calendar, did away with the University of Istanbul’s theology faculty, created commercial legal codes by copying German and Swiss models, stated that every person was free to choose his own religion, authorized the erection of statues with human likenesses, ended the ban on alcohol (Atatürk liked to drink), converted the mosque of Hagia Sophia into a secular museum, authorized the election of the first Turkish beauty queen, and banned the wearing of the fez.

You may imagine that this last decision was over a trivial matter, but you would be wrong. The fez, the red cap worn by many Turks, conveyed social standing and, because it lacked a brim, made it possible for its wearer to touch the ground with his forehead when saying prayers. Western hats, equipped with brims, made this impossible. When the ban on the fez was announced, riots erupted in many Turkish cities, and some 20 leaders were executed.

Atatürk created the machinery (though not the fact) of democracy and made it clear that he wanted a thoroughly secular state. After his death, real democratic politics began to be practiced, as a result of which some of the anti-Islam laws were modified. Even so, no other Middle Eastern Muslim nation has undergone as dramatic a change. In the rest of the region, autocrats still rule; they deal with religion by either buying it off or allowing it to dominate the spiritual order, provided it keeps its hands off real power.

On occasion, a fundamentalist Islamic regime comes to power, as happened in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Sudan. But these regimes have failed, ousted from Afghanistan by Western military power and declining in Iran and Sudan owing to economic incompetence and cultural rigidity.

The touchstones for Western success in reconciling religion and freedom were nationalism and Christianity, two doctrines that today many sophisticated people either ignore or distrust. But then they did not have to spend four centuries establishing freedom of conscience. We are being optimistic if we think that, absent a unique ruler such as Atatürk and a rare opportunity such as a world war, the Middle East will be able to accomplish this much faster.

Both the West and Islam face major challenges that emerge from their ruling principles. When the West reconciled religion and freedom, it did so by making the individual the focus of society, and the price it has paid has been individualism run rampant, in the form of weak marriages, high rates of crime, and alienated personalities. When Islam kept religion at the expense of freedom, it did so by making the individual subordinate to society, and the price it has paid has been autocratic governments, religious intolerance, and little personal freedom.

I believe that in time Islam will become modern, because without religious freedom, modern government is impossible. I hope that in time the West will reaffirm social contracts, because without them a decent life is impossible. But in the near term, Islam will be on the defensive culturally—which means it will be on the offensive politically. And the West will be on the offensive culturally, which I suspect means it will be on the defensive morally.

If the Middle East is to encounter and not merely resist modernity, it would best if it did this before it runs out of oil.

The Reform Islam Needs by James Q. Wilson, City Journal Autumn 2002

March 16, 2008

The American Muslim (TAM)

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 8:21 pm

 

RESPECTING THE QUR’AN

by Ingrid Mattson, PhD

Geert Wilders is a Dutch politician who broke with a mainstream national party to form his own extreme-right, anti-immigrant platform.  Wilders has directed most of his hatred in recent years at Muslims.  Wilders has called for the Qur’an to be banned and in the last few months has been promoting his “documentary” attacking the Qur’an.  Wilders has intimated that the documentary will show a copy of the Qur’an being desecrated or destroyed.

Geert Wilders wants the Qur’an to be banned.  Many Muslims want Wilders’ film to be banned.  Wilders wants Muslims out of “his country” and to be denied the rights of other citizens to practice their faith.  No doubt, many Dutch Muslims wish that Wilders would just go away (and Wilders has received threats of violence from some).  Neither Wilders nor these Muslims will (or should) get what they want.  Now what?

Many have looked to this situation only through the lense of the law.  News articles have focused on threats made to Wilders’ life and the calls to ban his film.  Of course, the threats are unacceptable and criminal.  Wilders should be afforded the full protection of the law and those threatening violence against his person should be prosecuted.

As for the right of freedom of speech, Wilders’ film should be treated like other statements within Dutch law.  The Netherlands, like most other countries, has certain restrictions on speech that is defamatory, libelous or insults a group of people based on their race or religion.  The Dutch Prime Minister has publicly stated that if the film, once released, is judged to have violated the law, then his government has the duty to enforce their legislation.  This treatment of Dutch Muslims as equal citizens under the law shows to the Muslim world that the Netherlands is not an enemy to Islam.

My plea is that we also need to look at this issue more broadly so we can find better ways of living together in a world in which there will always be people whose views and beliefs we find odd or even obnoxious.  We should not justify or excuse extremism of any kind, whether they are racist and hateful attacks on the Muslim community or vigilante violence by Muslims against those who make such statements.  What we should try to understand is why some otherwise ordinary people feel caught in the middle, and are sometimes attracted, in part, to the emotional appeals of the extremists.

In the last few decades most societies in the world have gone through enormous transitions.  Many European countries have had to give up significant symbols of their national sovereignty to join the European Union and even those who did not join the EU have seen significant changes in their societies due to globalization.  Even those who have benefited economically and in other ways from these changes are sometimes troubled by the loss of traditional forms of communal solidarity and culture: local farmers’ markets, church pews filled with families on a Sunday morning, neighborhood bakeries and craftsmen; landscapes, streetscapes and the rhythm of life have changed.  Perhaps each generation has a limited capacity for change, or perhaps none of us, as progressive as we claim to be, can help but romanticize the society of our youth. 

An increased presence of Muslims in Europe, while part of this change, is not the cause of all these changes.  Muslims did not cause a decline in attendance at European churches; they were not responsible for the fact that some churches have been turned into museums or bars.  Muslims did not cause the declining birth-rate in many European societies.  But the fact that Muslims are building mosques and attending religious services in higher numbers than European Christians, and that many Muslims have larger families than most European Christian families, makes Muslims easy targets of scapegoating.  Europe has seen this kind of ethnic hatred before in its history.  Financially-successful Jews were for many centuries viewed with jealously and resentment by some European Christians. 

Muslims should not be scapegoats for the problems not of their making. At the same time, we have to be fair and acknowledge the fact that large-scale Muslim immigration to Europe has presented real challenges to these societies.  Unlike in the United States, many of these immigrants arrived with little education and were often settled in large numbers in government housing that set them apart from the rest of the population.  The natural process of adaptation to the new environment was stifled by many of these well-meaning policies.  On the other hand, blatant and persistent discrimination experienced by many immigrants in their daily lives, combined with the availability of some extreme Islamic ideologies in the communities too often mitigated against a positive model of integration. 

Most of the time, however, the problems have been cultural.  This is because even when communities share the same basic values (as I believe is true of most European Christians and Muslims), the different cultural ways communities express these values can lead to misunderstandings and tensions.  Our values are conveyed not only with words, but with our actions, our clothing, and our architecture.

Let’s look, for example, at the issue of respect, an important value in any society.  What constitutes a respectful encounter with another?  In many east-Asian societies, business cards need to be offered with two hands like a gift; to thrust a card out towards a new acquaintance is interpreted as rude.  In American society, one indicates interest, respect and attention when speaking to others by looking them straight in the eye.  In many Muslim cultures, such a direct gaze might be considered disrespectful, especially if one is conversing with an elder or a member of the opposite sex.  I once had a student who complained to me about another student in the class: ‘he is so disrespectful to women,’ she said, ‘he never looks at me.’ The young man, an international student from a Middle Eastern country expressed dismay at her perception, ‘I was trying to respect her by not staring at her!”

The point is that you cannot simultaneously look someone straight in the eye and avert your gaze from them.  Only one of these culturally specific means of signifying respect can be adopted in any one encounter.  Most people learn to adapt, and even become bicultural.  But this process takes time, and if the differences are politicized or idealized, conflict ensues.

As new communities settle in areas that previously were inhabited by a dominant cultural group, misunderstandings can multiply.  I grew up in a mid-size Canadian town first settled by German, and then English and Irish immigrants.  I heard many nasty comments when Portuguese families started moving to town and planted their front yards with vegetable gardens.  We lived in a Platonic universe where beanstalks and carrot tops must line up in the backyard, never in the front. 

These adjustments are natural, they happen every day across the world.  Muslims have for centuries adopted their cultures and customs to new environments; that is why from Indonesia to Jordan to Senegal, Muslims differ in their dress, architecture, aesthetics, economies and other aspects of community life.  Islamic law, in fact, requires the adoption of “good” customs as long as they do not violate fundamental religious principles. 

European Muslims are slowly figuring out what is necessary and sacred in their lives and what is cultural and can be adjusted and adapted.  Most Europeans understand that this can be a difficult process, and they are patient and supportive of their Muslim neighbors.  Unfortunately, the voices of self-proclaimed nationalists – really, racists – like Wilders, often seem louder and more powerful because they are threatening.  This is also true of the extremists in the Muslim community who preach against good relations with non-Muslims.  Although they are small in number, they can affect great damage to society. 

The most important thing to keep in mind in the midst of all this changes is that we can never live together peacefully with all our differences unless we are willing to respect the different choices that others make.  We do not have to agree with each other or love each other, but we have to afford respect to each other.  This means that we do not deliberately try to humiliate each other.  Defacing or destroying symbols of each other’s most cherished beliefs violates the basic principle of respect.

Wilders’ actions are designed to hurt, offend, and even intimidate.  This is why many Dutch people, including the current government, have rejected Wilders’ actions and insist that such hateful statements are not consistent with Dutch values of tolerance and communal harmony.  Many Dutch Muslims have responded positively to an assertion of Dutch citizenship based on diversity within the framework of common values and they are working with their non-Muslim neighbors to create a positive environment of mutual respect.

Still, there are some people who are just looking for a fight.  No matter how many Dutch interfaith and civic groups join with their Muslim neighbors to demonstrate their solidarity and mutual respect, al-Qaeda and their ilk will point to Wilders’ film as more proof of the “Western crusade against Islam.” And no matter how many Muslims respond to Wilders’ film calmly, or not at all, Wilders will point to the violent response of some extremists as more proof that Islam is barbaric. 

All I ask is that we do not blame whole communities for the actions of a few.  Muslims should not blame all the Dutch people, much less “the West,” for Wilders’ hateful actions.  Similarly, no one should blame all Muslims, much less Islam, for the hateful actions of some extremists.

As for me, I have vowed that if and when Wilders releases his film, the first thing I will do is pick up my Qur’an, kiss it as a symbol of the reverence it deserves from me, then sit down and read it for an hour.  This is the best defense of the Qur’an.

Ingrid Mattson is President of The Islamic Society of North America

The American Muslim (TAM)

Islamist Recommendations or Mandates? - Middle East Forum

Filed under: News — ftaslimi @ 2:40 pm

 

Islamist Recommendations or Mandates?

by R. John Matthies
Family Security Matters
February 25, 2008

Not long ago a list of “unique issues affecting Muslim Americans” was posted at the Muslim Americans for Obama ‘08 website. This describes a number of “recommendations” drafted to advance the discussion of lawful Islamism and exceptional accommodation in the United States. These suggest both that “Islamic” comportment is beyond reproach, and that one is always correct to press the case for inviolable “Muslim” space.

The “recommendations” described are neither fantastical nor improbable. In fact, if the United States has by this time failed to enact the variety of accommodations embraced by our Western allies, it is clear that, on the ground and across the United States, private institutions and local governing bodies have taken the lead in obliging Islamist groups. This is simply to say that the present list of wishes (untouched for spelling and grammar) has become very real for many.

QUESTION: What are issues and recommendations for solutions that are unique to Muslim Americans?

1. A Law against harrassment of Muslim women wearing Hijab at the Airport, DMV and other public arenas.

2. Institute a Law to allow Muslim Employees to take a hours off from work for Friday Jummah [congregational] Prayer.

3. Make the 2 Eid’s [holidays to mark the end of Ramadan and the Festival of Sacrifice], recognized National Holidays on Calendars with days off from work.

4. Optional Halal meals in federal buildiings, public schools and colleges.

5. Provide prayer areas suitable for Salah [ritual prayer] and Jummah, in public and private facilities. (i.e. Malls, Airports, Universities and government buildings.)

6. Organize a Muslim American group to assist in recommendations for US foreign policy affecting majority Muslim countries.

Consider the first example, which concerns hijabs (headscarves) at the DMV. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has long been active on this front – and in 2004 produced a document titled Religious Accommodation in Driver’s License Photographs. Here one reads that: “South Carolina, Michigan and West Virginia allow veiled women privacy in taking a full-faced picture; Kansas, Pennsylvania and Indiana allow veiled women a no-photo driver’s license; […] and that Nevada allows photos with ‘drastic alteration of appearance.’”

CAIR has also celebrated several victories recently: first in San Diego, California, where a sheriff’s department employee was allowed to re-shoot her identification card to include hijab; and in the states of New York and Ohio, which now allow for partially obscured driver’s license photographs.

The second recommendation has become a reality for many. In Nebraska last year, for example, Swift & Co. agreed to “tweak” break times to accommodate the daily sunset prayer. This was decided to allow dozens of striking workers, who complained their right to worship freely was denied them, to return to work. And in Pennsylvania, Muslim employees who quit work at Arnold Logistics, following a “misunderstanding” as to the five minutes’ break allocated to employees, are back on the job, with a 15-minute accommodation for their daily prayers. Dell, Tyson Foods, and Whirlpool claim similar experience.

The third has not yet become a national priority, although it is not uncommon for observant Muslims to stay home the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. And a growing number of schoolchildren (in New Jersey, for example) are finding they are not required to attend class on Muslim holidays, or that the days are classless altogether. And New York State Senator John D. Sabini, hoping to deliver Garden State equanimity to his constituents, introduced a bill into the state senate that would require the city school district of New York City to recognize the Eid holidays as it does those for other faiths.

As for the fourth: Halal meals, you say? These are available at a number of American colleges and universities, including, claims the Halal Digest, Harvard University, Syracuse University, University of Connecticut, Cornell University, Boston University and Dartmouth College. But one is most likely to discover halal optional in federal prison, where access to these and kosher platters is required. Add to this that the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in January that prison officials in Arizona must demonstrate “real hardship” before they can deny halal meals to Muslim inmates.

Fifth: Prayer areas suggested or retained for exclusive Muslim use at the airport at university (or at the hospital) have become more common. But as for a federal mandate requiring prayer facilities at retail outlets like the Mall of America, for example, and across the private sector, it appears one will (for the moment, anyway) have to do with ecumenical or shared-use facilities.

Sixth, and finally: where it’s a question of Muslims advising foreign policy decisions, one only has to consider the appointment of U.S. “special envoy” to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The individual, who has yet to be named, will be tasked to “maintain formal contact with the OIC Secretariat, the Secretary General, the chairing country, plus other member countries, to follow OIC affairs and activities, understand the views of OIC members and leaders, seek ways for the U.S. and the OIC to cooperate, and seek to promote U.S. views on important policy matters that may come before the OIC.” This represents a first-ever appointment to the body on the part of the United States government.

But domestic matters also press: Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum recently agreed to establish a Muslim community advisory group, tasked to offer educational programs on Islam and Muslims to Justice staff. The decision, which the Attorney General reached after consulting with members of CAIR, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the ACLU of Florida, and the Florida Muslim Bar Association, appears a means to make good for allegedly directing staffers to view “Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against the West.”

The examples supplied above are by no means the only of their kind. These represent a sampling – limited to the United States, for obvious reasons – from among those making news most recently. The fact is that the issues associated with lawful Islamism and outsized accommodation are well more advanced in Western Europe (in Great Britain, notably) and in Canada than they are in the United States.

But it’s clear that accommodation does not, in every case, portend disaster. Private employers are free to change or stagger break times as they see fit, to accommodate employee worship, provided they do this of their own free will, and that the change does not disrupt staff and operations. Likewise, in districts where schoolchildren are granted leave for ritual holidays, it makes no sense to deny the same right to Muslims – provided student enrollment makes this meaningful. Similarly, one cannot disallow halal meals where one already offers confessional platters, or where demand makes this reasonable.

On the other hand, to suggest that government allow for partially veiled-user identification cards, which can only trouble law enforcement; impose exclusive-use facilities for Muslim faithful; or commission faith-based advisory boards, is to admit to ignorance of the Constitutional separation of powers, the American democratic tradition, and the idea, finally, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” One might also allow that a program like this has for goal to smash the bedrock foundation of civil society, breach the American social contract, and/or promote a regime of auto-segregation and exception.

American Muslims enjoy the rights and responsibilities available to every other citizen, as well they should. Muslims are also invited to conduct their faith in view